

AFRICAN UNION

الاتحاد الإفريقي



UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

CAERT, B.P 141 Bureau Poste El-Mohammadia Alger, Algérie, Tel +213 21 520 1 10 Fax +213 21 5203 78
Email : admin@caert.org.dz

ACSRT / CAERT

African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism

Terrorism

Bi-weekly Press Review

16 - 30 April 2016

Review no. 113



Press Review 16—30 April 2016

Table of Contents

	Pages
Terrorism in Africa	
- Countering Violent Extremism: The Horn of Africa	4
- Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (III): West Africa	10
- Mettre en œuvre l'architecture de paix et de sécurité (III) : l'Afrique de l'Ouest	14
- Migrants: la reprise des migrations en provenance d'Afrique de l'Ouest	18
Angola	
- Building Stronger Governance and Compliance Foundations in Sub-Saharan Africa	20
Cote d'ivoire	
- French West Africa terror ignores investor agenda	23
Ghana	
- Ghana et Togo "prochaines cibles" d'attaques "terroristes"	25
Libya	
- Libyan smuggling route grows 1 year after mass drowning	27
Nigeria	
- US 'training forces' to fight Boko Haram	30
- Boko Haram - FG Seeks Support for 80,000 Displaced Nigerians in Cameroon	33
Somalia	
- Shabaab video raises questions over AMISOM's base defence	34
- Al-Shabaab going under: Militants face worst year ever	36
International Organizations	
EU	
- The Strategic Interests of the European Union	38
Terrorism in the World	
- The ISIS Threat To Southeast Asia – Analysis	44
Belgium	
- Les terroristes viseraient des plages cet été	46
- Daech voudrait attaquer des plages en Europe	48
- Does Heightened Security Really Matter After Terrorists Strike?	50
Iraq	
- Leaked Islamic State records deliver insight into fighters	53
- Islamic State fighters from 70 countries, analysis shows	55

- The Islamic State may be losing ground, but not influence 58

Italy

- News Analysis: Italian experts warn not to mix up migrant crisis with terror threat 63

- Decriminalizing cannabis would hurt Islamic State, mafia- Italy prosecutor 65

Turkey

- Can Turkey boost the Muslim world's counterterrorism efforts? 67

USA

- Back to Square One in Libya 70

- Countering Violent Extremism: The War on Terror, Reset 72

Countering Violent Extremism: The Horn of Africa

27 April 2016



CC BY

As José Luengo-Cabrera and Annelies Pauwels see it, the Horn of Africa remains a breeding ground for violent extremism. In response, the area's stakeholders need to embrace the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) concept. For CVE to work, however, it needs to be more evidence-based, regionally coordinated, and mindful of local dynamics.

By José Luengo-Cabrera and Annelies Pauwels for European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)

This article was originally published by the [European Union Institute for Security Studies \(EUISS\)](#) in April 2016.

The Horn of Africa has gained notoriety as a breeding ground for violent extremism. Although the rise of al-Shabaab and the recurrent terrorist attacks in Somalia and Kenya have dominated news headlines and international counterterrorist efforts, other countries in the region have been (and continue to be) affected by extreme forms of violence. From the rise of a violent armed opposition in Djibouti to the harsh repression and incarceration of political dissidents in Ethiopia or the ongoing clashes

between government forces and rebel factions in Darfur and South Sudan, conditions in the Horn remain conducive to different forms of radicalisation.

Widespread poverty, forced displacement, food insecurity and political marginalisation are the oft-cited sources of grievance which groups like al-Shabaab, the Lord's Resistance Army or the Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdel Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) – exploit for recruitment purposes. Given the limited results of counter-terrorism (CT) campaigns based on militarised law enforcement methods, international efforts are increasingly focused on adopting an approach which seeks to dissuade at-risk groups and individuals from joining violent armed movements – terrorist or otherwise.

Countering violent extremism (CVE) has thus emerged as an internationally-funded set of grass roots initiatives to address the problem of extremist violence in a preventive (as opposed to reactive) manner. But although progress has been made, CVE in the Horn remains a fledgling and largely underfunded practice. It also continues to be regionally fragmented and is mostly implemented in an *ad hoc* manner. Due to the multiplicity of instruments required to address the complex web of interrelated drivers of radicalisation, CVE remains a tall order. Engaged international partners would benefit from fundamentally re-thinking their programmatic approach by making it more evidence-based, regionally coordinated and mindful of idiosyncratic local dynamics.


CT: the record

At a time when terrorist attacks and casualties have increased globally, a greater variety of extremist groups have emerged and come to control wider territorial swathes, with a rising number of 'foreign fighters' travelling from afar to join them. As a result, the heavy-handed and almost exclusively militarised approaches to combatting terrorism across Africa has been put into question, most notably as Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliates of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) continue to carry out attacks, with the vast majority of casualties attributed to the Nigerian and Somali jihadist groups.

Since the 1990s, in particular following the 1998 al-Qaeda bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the Horn of Africa has been one of the main theatres of international CT efforts. Despite some positive results (notably the expulsion of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and Kismayo), the overwhelmingly military measures have recurrently triggered terrorist backlashes – such as the July 2010 suicide bombings in Kampala or the 2013 attack at the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, for example. In addition, al-Shabaab has also been carrying out retaliatory attacks against the African Union's peace support operation (AMISOM) or the Kenyan and Ugandan armed forces – who have been leading the regional CT campaign against the al-Qaeda affiliate.

Meanwhile, the Kenyan and Ugandan governments have become the targets of widespread public condemnation for violating civil liberties and human rights – and similar criticism has been directed against the governments in Sudan and Ethiopia. State authorities have been accused by human rights advocacy groups of using anti-terrorism legislation to crack down on political opponents, human rights defenders and dissidents. In Kenya, national security forces have been implicated in acts of

torture, unlawful killings and the disappearance of terrorist suspects, principally of Somali origin. Police units have also been involved in the unlawful detention and harassment of journalists, human rights activists and international aid workers.



Criticism has also extended to several operations carried out in response to terrorist attacks. The November 2012 raid in the Suq Mugdi market in Garissa and Operation ‘Usalama Watch’ in the Nairobi neighbourhood of Eastleigh and in Mombasa in April 2014 indiscriminately targeted entire communities (mostly composed of ethnic Somalis) rather than focusing on suspected individuals. In response, al-Shabaab has launched and claimed revenge attacks targeting civilians – most notably the April 2015 armed assault at Garissa University, in which 148 students were killed. Following the January 2016 al-Shabaab attack on an AMISOM base hosting Kenyan troops in the Gedo region of Somalia, the US has intensified airstrikes against training camps in south-central Somalia, raising the spectre of further retaliation.

The overall lack of transparency and overtly militarised CT operations, combined with inadequate and inconclusive investigations into human rights violations by government forces, has had a number of damaging consequences. In Kenya, for example, this has led to higher levels of societal prejudice against Muslims and ethnic Somalis, increasing social alienation and fostering radicalisation among targeted communities. In Ethiopia, government forces continue to suppress demonstrations of ethnic Oromos with the arbitrary arrest of individuals accused of belonging to the Oromo Liberation Front – a banned opposition movement that the ruling party has labelled as a terrorist organisation.

CVE: the drivers

As a result of all this, national and international policymakers have shifted their attention towards more human security-centred approaches to combating terrorism. Within the Horn area, a number of CVE programmes now focus on the preventive dimension of violent extremism. Such programmes have principally been led and financed by donor governments – the UK, Denmark, the US – or intergovernmental organisations – UN, EU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa (IGAD) or the East African Community (EAC) – that rely on the experience and expertise of international and local practitioners or civil society organisations (CSOs) for their implementation.

The UK's Department for International Development (DFID), for instance, set up its Sustainable Employment and Economic Development (SEED) programme in Somalia in 2011. The four-year initiative was a mainstream livelihood programme with a CVE sub-objective. Generally, instead of running specific CVE initiatives, DFID has aimed at understanding the CVE relevance of new development programmes. In particular, it often establishes whether programmes serve dual objectives (i.e. CVE and development) and whether they need to abide by the principle of 'do no harm'. This approach, aimed at mitigating the risk of antagonising specific communities, was then extended to SEED II, which adjusted its focus onto reducing conflict proneness and fostering stability in and around Mogadishu, notably through job-creation initiatives.

Similarly, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has adopted a policy which acknowledges the essential role of development in addressing grievances that drive violent extremism. Also in 2011, USAID's Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) was extended to include a CVE component with a focus on the infamous Nairobi neighbourhood of Eastleigh (KTI-E). The programme worked with local enablers engaged in youth activities – particularly livelihood training and counselling for post-traumatic stress disorder. KTI-E operated through small grants that funded activities such as public debates on issues related to extremism, inter-faith dialogue and cultural events.

Following the path laid out by the UK and US governments, the European Commission launched a pilot CVE project in 2014 centred on Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. The three-year regional programme is part of the Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) initiative, with a €2 million budget funded by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). The programme aims at understanding the drivers of violent extremism, principally through evidence-based analysis – so as to develop best practices that could increase the impact of targeted interventions. With activities ranging from training law-enforcement officers on how to partner with CSOs to providing guidance to women's organisations in Puntland and Somaliland on how to engage with security providers or identifying at-risk youth in Kenya, this STRIVE pilot project is a venture that seeks to come up with recommendations to improve programme efficacy.

But such recommendations are bound to be imperfect (or even misleading) as long as progress on the evaluative side of programming is lagging. With USAID taking the lead in assessing its CVE projects in East Africa, independent evaluators under the auspices of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC) have

laid out some of the conceptual and operational hindrances to valuing CVE programmes. Indeed, lack of clarity over the nature and extent of CVE programmes has made it difficult to establish benchmarks and indicators for success. Given the difficulties in determining the scope of a CVE programme evaluation – or even attributing causality where the desired outcome is a non-event (i.e. number of individuals not being radicalised) – questions have been raised over their reliability and applicability across regions.

Assessing CVE

CVE programming has been criticised for not being sufficiently context-specific and for designing interventions based on anecdotal observation. Following a 2014 external review of KTI-E, for instance, it emerged that there was a need for a more systematic identification of at-risk population cohorts, particularly as many groups that were arguably eligible for inclusion in the programme did not end up participating.

The SEED initiative, for example, would have benefitted from a more thorough screening of target groups that could be classified as being at-risk – i.e. looking beyond the lack of employment opportunities or low sources of income. Indeed, the DFID project targeted youth cohorts exclusively on the basis of ‘livelihood vulnerabilities’, as opposed to a wider assessment of the drivers of violent extremism. Tellingly, following KTI-E’s external evaluation, an important realisation shed light on the alleged confusion with regards to the selection of target groups: programme inclusion was largely delimited to those supporting violence as opposed to those directly involved in it.

As hindrances to implementation and evaluation continue to surface, CVE programmes continue to fall short of preventing at-risk individuals from falling into the hands of violent militias or terrorist organisations. It has to be said, however, that budgetary allocations for monitoring and evaluation procedures are estimated to be around 10%, a seemingly insufficient amount for external evaluators to carry out exhaustive assessments. Moreover, such evaluations remain largely unavailable to the public, making it difficult to carry out cross-programme comparisons and highlight best practices. With an average shelf-life of three years and budgets that remain meagre when compared with those allocated for CT operations, it comes as no surprise that the ‘lessons learnt’ from CVE programmes remain largely inconclusive. This has raised the issue of standardised methods and how to go about measuring the impact of CVE projects.

From diagnosis to prognosis

CVE remains a conflict prevention subset that acknowledges that the drivers of violent extremism are linked to the political and socio-economic conditions that fall within the realm of development work. But CVE has been a mixed experience thus far. Unintended consequences during community-level interventions have prompted a policy review leading to a stronger focus on the prognosis dimension of programmes. This would require a more granular (ex-ante) mapping of groups susceptible to recruitment but also a greater focus on comprehending the individual-level (material and psychological) incentives for radicalisation.

A revamped approach would therefore have to rely more systematically on prevention foresight. This means going beyond the simple identification of root causes and

more towards assessing the likelihood of groups or individuals to engage in violent extremism. The Kenyan government's Strengthening Community Resilience against Extremism (SCORE) programme in Kilifi County, for example, offers an encouraging approach to prevention through its 'community tension monitoring' mechanism, aimed at identifying predictable signs of radicalisation.

CVE initiatives tend to have a bigger impact when donor agencies, government authorities (at all levels) and CSOs are equal stakeholders. CSOs, in coordination with international NGOs, tend to be anchored in local communities and are therefore most apt at identifying and assisting at-risk groups. But donor agencies often fail to address the limited institutional and operational capacity of local CSO staff when hiring them for CVE projects. The USAID-led Somali Youth Livelihoods Programme (SYLP), for example, was hindered by low instructor quality and a lack of grant management skills, which were addressed only after the project was launched. This has set a precedent for the way forward in addressing the manifold constraints arising from poor coordination and funding.

Coordination and resources

Following the ministerial statements at the White House summit held in February 2015, Horn experts agreed to establish a regional CVE hub under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Eastern Africa. This initiative, however, still lacks stakeholder coordination, and the provision of donors' support is based on their respective CVE policies rather than on an agreed regional strategy that is contextualised to fit country-specific risks. Although IGAD has taken the lead in attempting to coordinate all CVE-related projects in the region, international partners continue to implement their programmes largely in an *ad hoc* manner, essentially adding to the geographical imbalance and regional fragmentation of CVE projects.

Since its establishment in 2011, the Horn of Africa Working Group of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) has been periodically interacting with experts, officials and community-based CSOs in the region in an effort to foster local resilience as a means to prevent and counter violent extremism. It is clear, however, that without greater financial resources, a fundamental overhaul of evaluation practices and a greater capacity to implement and coordinate (especially beyond Kenya and Somalia) region-wide initiatives that involve local CSOs, results will continue to fall short of expectations. If and when more evidence-based 'lessons learnt' in this regional process come to light, it may offer valuable indications for countering violent extremism also elsewhere across the African continent.

For more information on issues and events that shape our world, please visit the [ISN Blog](#) or browse our [resources](#).

José Luengo-Cabrera is an associate analyst at the EUISS and specialises in African political economy and security-related developments on the continent.

<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=196637>

Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (III): West Africa

15 April 2016



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), now in its 41st year, has a formidable record, both in its efforts to enhance regional economic integration, its initial mandate, and to promote peace in a particularly turbulent region. Still, the organisation has demonstrated shortcomings requiring significant institutional change. Reform is essential to give the organisation new impetus, and is ever more urgent as insecurity worsens throughout the Sahel and Lake Chad regions – crisis zones extending beyond ECOWAS’s geographic area and where it has limited impact and influence.

Comprising fifteen states of great political, linguistic and economic diversity and spanning a vast geographic area from the Atlantic coast to the Sahara desert, ECOWAS has been the most sought-after African regional economic body in the field of peace and security in the past 25 years. The organisation, itself composed of fragile states, has been forced to put out fires within its own member states.

The ECOWAS region has experienced over forty coups since the independence era and seen some of its leaders trying to keep their grip on power at any cost, or establish political dynasties. The body has also been confronted with more complex crises in the form of identity-based armed rebellion, as in Côte d’Ivoire, or jihadist threats, most recently in Mali. Since the 1990s, through the authority of its Heads of State and Government, ECOWAS has reacted to these crises systematically. It has yielded incontestable political and diplomatic results, but its military record is more mixed.

ECOWAS's interventions in Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Burkina Faso have highlighted the organisation's strengths, but also its limits. It has neglected several of its key objectives, including strengthening the political and security institutions of member states, reassessing all dimensions of its Standby Force and enhancing regional cooperation on transnational security threats. Such threats pose a challenge to established crisis prevention or resolution mechanisms, and cannot be overcome by traditional mediation tactics and the deployment of military missions.

The organisation has developed a number of strategy documents and action plans in recent years to correct its shortcomings, but must implement them fully to address myriad threats. These include the trafficking of drugs, weapons and humans; the proliferation of groups linked to transnational terrorist organisations; and the major regional challenges of poverty, unemployment and significant population growth. In addition, ECOWAS needs to undertake significant internal reorganisation, modernise its human resources management and develop a results-based culture. The new president of the ECOWAS Commission, Marcel Alain de Souza, should make it a priority as pledged in his inaugural speech on 8 April 2016. Nigeria, which through its economic and demographic dominance wields unmatched influence in West Africa, must also play a leading role in implementing these reforms.

This report, the third and final in a series analysing the regional dimension of insecurity in Africa and collective and individual state responses, presents ECOWAS's current institutional apparatus in the field of peace and security, and analyses its responses and deficiencies through three case studies: Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Burkina Faso. It is part of a broader reflection on the changing nature of conflict and growing transnational threats, problems requiring novel solutions which regional bodies are well placed to find. This report considers what institutional reforms need to be undertaken to improve ECOWAS's collective action in the face of formidable challenges to peace and security in West Africa.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To strengthen ECOWAS's institutions in the field of peace and security

To ECOWAS's Authority of Heads of State and Government:

1. Reaffirm the essential and irreversible nature of the implementation of the institutional reform proposed in 2013 that aimed to strengthen the organisation's capacity in the field of peace, security, stability and social and economic development.
2. Create a working group tasked with monitoring the implementation of this reform process, including heads of state and government, or, alternatively, high-level political figures, representative of the political, cultural and linguistic diversity of ECOWAS.

To the president of Nigeria:

3. View the restoration of Nigerian diplomacy and its influence throughout Africa as a priority for the federal government, and make the revitalisation of ECOWAS a central pillar of this renewed diplomatic role.
4. Strengthen ECOWAS's capacity by supplying additional financial resources to peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions.

To the president of the ECOWAS Commission:

5. Take immediate action to improve the efficiency of departments, by addressing dysfunctions within human resources management, administration and finance, and blockages or delays in the implementation of decisions which result from the concentration of power within the commission presidency.

To improve ECOWAS's efficiency in attaining its objectives for peace and security

To the ECOWAS Commission:

6. Accompany member states in the reform of their political practices to strengthen their legitimacy and effectiveness, specifically in the areas of good governance and in strengthening their judiciaries in line with ECOWAS protocols, specifically by establishing ECOWAS permanent representation offices in every member state.

7. Strengthen the capacity of member states to face collectively transnational threats by:

a) creating an ECOWAS centre for the fight against organised crime that would integrate different action plans against transnational criminal activity, including terrorism, drug, human and arms trafficking and maritime piracy;

b) strengthening communication between Abuja, the permanent representation offices and member states;

c) encouraging them to develop greater knowledge of political and security dynamics in neighbouring regions, specifically North and Central Africa, and ensuring regional collaboration occurs at political, technical and operational levels, and engages all actors, including the judicial system;

d) strengthening significantly ECOWAS's expertise on other regional economic communities in Africa and throughout the world, and inviting other regional economic communities in Africa and the African Union (AU) to define a framework of coordination and collaboration on issues of terrorism, trafficking, maritime security, money laundering, infiltration and destabilisation of states by criminal networks.

8. Implement the recommendations of ECOWAS's self-assessment conducted in 2013 following the Mali crisis, specifically those concerning operationalising the mediation facilitation division and re-examining all dimensions of the ECOWAS Stand-by Force (doctrine, operational procedures, logistical strategies and financing).

To West African civil society organisations:

9. Support publicly the recommendations contained in the institutional reform project proposed in 2013, and implement an ad hoc structure for West African civil society to independently monitor its implementation.

To AU member states and to the chairperson of the AU Commission:

10. Clarify the principles of subsidiarity, comparative advantage and responsibility sharing to quell tensions between the AU and ECOWAS during major crises in West Africa and its neighbours.

11. Continue to reflect on the doctrine, format and configuration of the African Stand-by Force with a view to better adapting the model to current threats and the

future of peace and security on the continent, drawing lessons from challenges encountered by ECOWAS.

To ECOWAS's international partners:

12. Support ECOWAS's institutional reform without interfering in the process, and continue technical and financial assistance projects while ensuring they do not reduce incentives for reform.

Dakar/Brussels, 14 April 2016

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/>

Mettre en œuvre l'architecture de paix et de sécurité (III) : l'Afrique de l'Ouest

15 Apr 2016



SYNTHESE ET RECOMMANDATIONS

La Communauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Cedeao) a célébré en 2015 son quarantième anniversaire. Aussi bien en matière d'intégration économique régionale, son mandat initial, que de promotion de la paix dans une région part-ti-cu-lièrement tourmentée, la Cedeao a un bilan à faire valoir. Mais elle a aussi des fai-bleesses évidentes nécessitant une profonde réforme institutionnelle. Cette réforme, cruciale pour donner un nouvel élan à l'organisation, est devenue une ur-gence alors que les menaces sécuritaires se multiplient dans la région du Sahel et celle du bassin du lac Tchad, deux foyers de crise qui dépassent le cadre géogra-phi-que de l'espace Cedeao et sur lesquels l'organisation a du mal à être influente et efficace.

Avec quinze Etats aux profils politique, linguistique et économique variés, occu-pant un vaste espace géographique entre côte atlantique et désert saharien, la Cedeao est la communauté économique régionale africaine la plus sollicitée depuis 25 ans sur le terrain de la paix et de la sécurité. Composée d'Etats fragiles n'ayant pas en-core stabilisé leurs systèmes politiques, les crises se succèdent, forçant l'orga-ni-sation à jouer un rôle de « pompier » dans les pays membres.

L'espace Cedeao a connu plus de quarante coups d'Etat depuis la période des indé-pendances, et fait l'expérience de dirigeants tentant de se maintenir coûte que coûte au pouvoir ou mettant en place des successions dynastiques. Elle a également été confrontée à des crises plus complexes, dans lesquelles l'instabilité politique a pris la forme de rébellions armées dans un contexte de clivages identitaires comme en

Côte d'Ivoire ou de menace jihadiste comme plus récemment au Mali. La Cedeao, à travers la Conférence des chefs d'Etat et la Commission, a ainsi depuis les années 1990 réagi de manière systématique à toutes ces crises, avec des résultats incontestables sur le plan politique et diplomatique, mais mitigés militairement.

Les interventions successives de la Cedeao en Guinée-Bissau, au Mali ou encore au Burkina Faso ont mis en lumière les points forts de l'organisation et les limites de sa capacité d'action. Malgré une mobilisation forte en temps et en moyens, certains objectifs clés ont été négligés, comme le renforcement des institutions politiques et sécuritaires des Etats membres, le réexamen de toutes les dimensions de sa Force en attente, ou la coopération régionale contre les menaces transnationales. Ces dernières défient les moyens classiques de prévention et de résolution des crises, au-delà des dispositifs classiques de médiation et de déploiement de missions militaires.

Un ensemble de documents stratégiques et de plans d'action ont été élaborés ces dernières années pour renforcer l'organisation et remédier à ses insuffisances. La mise en œuvre concrète de ces stratégies est indispensable pour faire face à l'économie criminelle des trafics de drogue, d'armes et d'êtres humains, à l'implantation de groupes liés aux réseaux terroristes internationaux, et aux défis majeurs que sont la pauvreté, le chômage et la forte croissance démographique. La réponse appropriée aux défaillances que révèle l'action de la Cedeao est avant tout une réforme institutionnelle afin d'engager une profonde réorganisation interne, une modernisation de la gestion des ressources humaines et l'instauration d'une culture du résultat. Le Nigéria, qui exerce grâce à son poids économique et démographique une influence inégalée en Afrique de l'Ouest, doit jouer un rôle moteur dans la mise en œuvre de ces réformes.

Ce rapport, le troisième et dernier d'une série qui analyse la dimension régionale de l'insécurité en Afrique et les solutions collectives et individuelles qui y sont apportées, présente le dispositif institutionnel actuel de la Cedeao dans le domaine de la paix et de la sécurité, et analyse ses réponses et ses insuffisances à travers trois études de cas : la Guinée-Bissau, le Mali et le Burkina Faso. Il s'inscrit dans la réflexion collective engagée face à l'évolution de la nature des conflits et à l'accroissement des menaces transnationales. Les organisations régionales ont un rôle crucial à jouer pour apporter des solutions à ces nouveaux phénomènes. Ce rapport envisage les réformes institutionnelles souhaitables pour améliorer l'action collective de la Cedeao face à l'immense défi de la paix et de la sécurité en Afrique de l'Ouest.

RECOMMANDATIONS

Pour renforcer les institutions de la Cedeao, tout particulièrement dans le domaine de la paix et de la sécurité

A la Conférence des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de la Cedeao :

1. Réaffirmer le caractère prioritaire et irréversible de la mise en œuvre du projet de réforme institutionnelle proposé en 2013 visant à renforcer la capacité de l'organisation dans les domaines de la paix, de la sécurité, de la stabilité et du développement économique et social.
2. Mettre en place un Groupe de travail chargé du suivi de la mise en œuvre de cette réforme, incluant chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement ou, à défaut, des personnalités

politiques de haut rang, représentatifs de la diversité politique, culturelle et linguistique de l'espace Cedeao.

Au président du Nigéria :

3. Considérer la restauration de la diplomatie nigériane et de son influence en Afrique comme une priorité pour le gouvernement fédéral et faire de la redynamisation de la Cedeao un axe essentiel de cette diplomatie renouvelée.

4. Renforcer la capacité de la Cedeao en apportant des ressources financières supplémentaires consacrées aux opérations de maintien ou d'imposition de la paix.

Au président de la Commission de la Cedeao :

5. Prendre des mesures immédiates visant à améliorer le fonctionnement des services, en réduisant les dysfonctionnements dans la gestion des ressources humaines, administratives et financières, et les blocages ou retards de mise en œuvre des décisions, qui résultent de la concentration des pouvoirs au niveau de la présidence de la Commission.

Pour renforcer l'efficacité de la Cedeao dans la poursuite de ses objectifs en matière de paix et de sécurité

A la Commission de la Cedeao :

6. Accompagner les pays membres dans des réformes de leur pratique politique afin de renforcer la légitimité et l'effectivité de l'Etat, tout particulièrement dans les domaines de la bonne gouvernance et du renforcement des institutions de contre-pouvoir (tel que le pouvoir judiciaire) en accord avec les protocoles de la Cedeao, notamment par la mise en place de bureaux permanents de représentation de la Cedeao dans chacun des Etats membres.

7. Construire et renforcer les capacités des Etats membres à faire face collectivement aux menaces transnationales majeures, et pour ce faire :

a) doter la Cedeao d'un véritable pôle de lutte contre le crime organisé intégrant différents plans d'action contre les activités criminelles transnationales, y compris le terrorisme, les trafics de drogue, de personnes, d'armes et la piraterie maritime ;

b) renforcer les moyens de communications entre Abuja, les bureaux de représentation nationale et les Etats membres ;

c) soutenir une meilleure connaissance et anticipation des dynamiques politiques et sécuritaires du voisinage de l'espace communautaire, notamment en Afrique du Nord et centrale, et s'assurer que la collaboration régionale se fait au niveau politique, technique et opérationnel, et engage l'ensemble des acteurs dont le système judiciaire ;

d) renforcer significativement la connaissance de la Cedeao sur les autres communautés économiques régionales africaines et les autres régions du monde, et inviter les autres communautés économiques régionales en Afrique et l'Union africaine (UA) à définir un cadre de concertation et de collaboration permanente sur les questions de terrorisme, de trafics criminels, de sécurité maritime, de blanchiment d'ar-

gent, de pénétration et de déstabilisation des Etats par les acteurs de l'économie criminelle.

8. Mettre en œuvre les recommandations de l'exercice d'auto-évaluation de la Cedeao après la crise au Mali conduit en 2013, notamment concernant l'opérationnalisation de la Division de facilitation des médiations et le réexamen de toutes les dimensions de la Force en attente de la Cedeao (doctrine, procédures opérationnelles, concept logistique et financements).

Aux organisations de la société civile des pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest :

9. Soutenir publiquement les recommandations formulées dans le cadre du projet de réforme institutionnelle de la Cedeao proposé en 2013, et établir une structure ad hoc de la société civile ouest-africaine pour effectuer le suivi indépendant de sa mise en œuvre.

Aux Etats membres de l'Union africaine et à la présidente de la Commission de l'Union africaine :

10. Clarifier les principes de subsidiarité, d'avantage comparatif et de partage des responsabilités afin de mettre fin aux tensions entre l'UA et la Cedeao lors de crises majeures en Afrique de l'Ouest et dans son voisinage.

11. Poursuivre la réflexion sur la doctrine, le format et la configuration de la Force africaine en attente en vue d'une meilleure adaptation du modèle aux menaces actuelles et futures à la paix et à la sécurité du continent, en tirant les leçons des difficultés rencontrées par la Cedeao.

Aux partenaires internationaux de la Cedeao :

12. Soutenir la réforme institutionnelle de la Cedeao sans ingérence dans le processus, et poursuivre les projets d'assistance technique et financière tout en s'assurant qu'ils ne réduisent pas les incitations pour l'organisation à se réformer.

Dakar/Bruxelles, 14 avril 2016

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/>

Migrants: la reprise des migrations en provenance d'Afrique de l'Ouest

le 23-04-2016



Des migrants à proximité des côtes libyennes, le 29 septembre 2015.

© REUTERS/Ismail Zitouny

Le naufrage d'un bateau de migrants la semaine dernière en Méditerranée a sans doute fait plus de 500 morts. Une estimation des Nations unies qui ont recueilli les témoignages de rescapés, au nombre de 41. Ils étaient partis de Tobrouk en Libye. Mais une autre route s'est ouverte ces derniers mois, à l'ouest de Tripoli. Et de plus en plus de migrants ouest-africains tentent leur chance pour rejoindre l'Europe avec l'espoir d'une vie meilleure.

Depuis l'été, à partir de Zouara, à l'ouest de Tripoli, les migrants en provenance d'Afrique de l'Ouest prennent eux aussi des barques pour l'Italie. Parmi les migrants qui prennent cette nouvelle route, il y a ceux qui vivent en Algérie. Et ils sont de plus en plus nombreux.

Il a la trentaine et du mal à sourire. Ce migrant camerounais vivait en Algérie. Et au mois de septembre dernier, il décide de partir en Europe via la Libye. Car, il entend qu'une route s'est ouverte pendant l'été.

« A Alger, l'info c'était qu'il y a un colonel à Tripoli qui est un chef rebelle, qui contrôle toute une région de Tripoli et qui fait partir les gens, les escorte avec ses chaloupes militaires jusqu'aux eaux internationales. Bref, l'info c'est : tout est sécurisé. »

A la frontière libyenne, il se retrouve dans un camp improvisé, avec des migrants qui viennent de toute l'Afrique de l'Ouest et d'Afrique centrale. *« D'autres pays d'Afrique comme la Côte d'Ivoire, le Mali même, le Cameroun, la Centrafrique. Beaucoup n'ont pas pris la route en venant. Ils sont au courant de ce qui se passe en*

Libye, de leur pays. Parce qu'il y a des gens qui sont passés par là qui peuvent leur donner cette information. »

Le jeune homme a réussi son passage et vit désormais en Italie. Sa réussite a poussé d'autres migrants qui le connaissait à prendre la même route, et depuis, les départs sont de plus en plus nombreux. Depuis le début de l'année, des dizaines de migrants camerounais installés en Algérie sont arrivés jusqu'en Italie. Et plusieurs sont morts en mer.

Nigériens, Gambiens, Sénégalais

Depuis l'automne dernier, on assiste à la réouverture des routes de migrations de l'Afrique de l'Ouest. Passés le désert du Niger et la Libye, les ressortissants d'Afrique de l'Ouest sont de plus en plus nombreux sur les côtes italiennes, explique Florence Kim, porte-parole de l'Organisation internationale des migrations.

« Sur les côtes italiennes, plus de 3 400 migrants sont des Nigériens, puis viennent les Gambiens et les Sénégalais. Donc on voit que depuis le début de l'année, il y a une grande partie des migrants qui sont d'origine ouest-africaine. 80% environ des migrants d'origine ouest-africaine sont des hommes, analyse Florence Kim. Ces migrants, en principe, n'ont pas nécessairement de projet migratoire en tête, à la différence des autres migrants. »

La porte-parole de l'OIM explique qu'« il y a une sorte de mixité du flux migratoire » puisque « dans certains pays comme le Nigeria, on le voit bien, il y a des raisons économiques qui motivent les départs mais également l'insécurité, la présence de Boko Haram. Mais encore une fois la raison principale est encore une fois d'offrir un avenir meilleur à sa propre personne, à sa famille ou à tout un village. »

<http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/>

Building Stronger Governance and Compliance Foundations in Sub-Saharan Africa

April 19, 2016



Analysts, politicians, economists and media pundits have kicked off 2016 with a largely pessimistic outlook for the global economy. Clearly none of us can predict where the economy will be in twelve months but we do know that we are looking at a ‘new normal’ of very low oil prices and a reduced demand for commodities. It is also clear that the world will continue to suffer from an increasingly potent and widespread form of terrorism that is extremely well-funded and sophisticated.

It is in this particularly worrisome context that policymakers here in Africa have to address the pervasive issue of money laundering and fraud in our financial systems. Doing so is, however, easier said than done.

The harsh reality is that Africa has faced a challenging environment when confronting these types of issues. It is also a region of multiple languages, currencies and financial systems. This means that in the past it was easy for criminals to carry out cross-border money-laundering. African governments therefore need to be serious about the fight against terrorism and money laundering.

Firstly, each nation has to get its own house in order from a governance and compliance perspective. Then the continent needs to build a regional consensus to work together, share information and adopt international anti-money laundering policies, which is critical for success in building stronger governance and compliance foundations across Africa.

In Angola, the journey towards good governance and compliance has been ongoing since peacetime in 2002. The country has experienced huge inflows of cash and a booming economy, which has utterly transformed the country. The banking sector has been liberalised during the past decade, the market has opened its doors to global trade and a lot of people have done extremely well. We have to be honest – when we learn that the world’s global banks have uncovered money-laundering on a global scale in the developed world in recent years – we have to accept that our growth is unlikely to have happened in a squeaky clean environment. Acknowledging the truth is crucial.

Angola as case study

This is why, in Angola, the war against money-laundering has gathered pace over the past few years. New laws were introduced in 2010 and 2011, which mandated that a very wide range of organisations and professionals adhere to new obligations, including obligations of refusal, record-keeping, cooperation, secrecy and training. The law applies to credit institutions, financial companies, insurance companies, pension fund managers, accountants, lawyers, public notaries and many others.

National banks in Angola are now legally mandated to inform the banks that they transact with, of their own global regulatory requirements – it is simply unacceptable for any banking institution to plead ignorance that their banking partners were not in compliance. In 2015 the BNA issued a new guide towards compliance that reflects the standards issued by the Basel Committee on banking supervision. All banks in Angola are mandated by law to submit an independently audited report laying out their actions on implementing FATF and Basel standards. These audits will be verified within the first half of 2016.

Building on these foundations, in 2016 we will focus on reviewing the audit report from BNA regulated institutions. These audits will be verified within the first half of 2016 by the BNA. The Bank will also announce a new policy framework on any additional recommendations from the FATF. In addition, other bodies such as the Capital Markets Commission, Insurance Companies Regulatory Associations, Customs and the Gambling and Casino Institute will continue to monitor their respective industries.

It is here that all African nations face another challenge – cultural and behavioural change. A modern economy must accept the need for stronger governance and compliance foundations. So, in 2016, the BNA will also place emphasis on its on-going financial literacy-training program (*launched in December 2015*) for several target groups. We are also launching training schemes for bank managers and young graduates in order to increase cooperation with other institutions.

The objective is to raise awareness around AML/FT measures, thus ensuring stability within the Angolan Financial System (AFS) and greater customer protection. Cultural change towards honesty and transparency will not happen overnight but every African nation has a moral responsibility to make this change happen.

The adoption of FATF regulations and policy recommendations is critical for the banking sector in Angola and for the region's reputation. We need to do the right thing and be seen to do so – this is important internationally to build trust as Angola looks to adopt even more stringent standards of transparency and governance. We know that the Angolan economy will continue to grow if global banking organizations, central banks and investors maintain trust in our systems and processes.

But we cannot make the kind of progress we need if we do not work as one continent. Shell companies, cross border transactions and the movement of goods need to be regulated with transparent cooperation between governments. Online activities, airport customs and ports and border controls can benefit from regional cooperation. Each of our domestic economies will benefit and the region will be much better equipped to prosper during difficult economic times.

The 'new normal' of low oil prices brings the issue of money laundering sharply in to focus. Our economies can no longer rely on extractives and we need to diversify our economies. This is not lost on Angolan policy makers. We need to stimulate domestic innovation, support entrepreneurs and create an enterprise economy. We cannot do that without mature and responsible capital markets.

To meet this objective, the Angolan government has introduced many initiatives – such as state-backed VC funds – and the BNA is doing its part by using the economic levers we have at our disposal to provide support for businesses, including SME's in high-growth sectors. Stable rates of inflation and competitive interest rates are crucial for growth and economic stability.

So, the BNA fully understands the national importance of the adoption of international regulations in relation to the nation's financial sector and wider economy – not to mention the obvious moral dimension. As a Central Bank, our job is to continue to meet internationally accepted standards and to create a well-governed financial system that provides access to capital for businesses. Achieving this goes hand-in-hand with the fight against the world's most insidious crimes and this has to be the responsibility of every Central Bank on the continent.

<https://www.proshareng.com/>

French West Africa terror ignores investor agenda

Apr 15 12:29



Gary Kleiman is senior partner, [Kleiman International Consultants](#), a global emerging economy and financial market advisory firm.

Along with desert fighting in the sub-Saharan Sahel region against government forces, terror groups brimming with arms after Libya's breakup have struck hotels in capital cities throughout the eight-country French West Africa Economic and Monetary Zone (WAEMU), a grouping with a common central bank and currency, the CFA Franc pegged to the euro.

Cote d'Ivoire beach resorts outside Abidjan were the latest targets, following assaults in Burkina Faso and Mali killing international aid workers and business executives. These countries are enmeshed in their own violent political conflicts, putting the priority on internal as well as external security. But their economic and financial agendas are also urgent and call for "strong resolve", according to the International Monetary Fund's March Article IV report.

Cote d'Ivoire is the biggest economy and home to the regional securities exchange, one of the few emerging markets to advance last year with meagre foreign participation, at only an estimated €300m in the past decade. Listed equities include local arms of multinational firms, telecoms provider Sonatel from Senegal, and cross-border banking group Ecobank headquartered in Togo.

Since its launch 20 years ago short-term government debt issuance has dominated and reached about €2.5bn, with Cote D'Ivoire and Senegal accounting for over half of placement. Three quarters of the total was bought by banks in Burkina Faso and Mali, but secondary trading is "extremely limited" without long-term institutional investors, the IMF points out. Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal, with speculative "B" range credit ratings, have also regularly tapped external sovereign markets, with the former's experience dating to before the 1990s Brady Plan.

Cote d'Ivoire has requested a new IMF programme after its three-year \$700m one from the post-civil war period expired at the end of 2015. Airport visitor arrivals rose 20 per cent through the middle of last year, but cocoa exports and reconstruction rather than tourism remain the leading economic drivers, with 7-8 per cent GDP growth predicted this year to outpace WAEMU as whole.

The regional average will be 6 per cent on solid domestic demand and agriculture

shipments abroad, but it could be 1.5 percentage points lower on global commodity and financing risks and structural reform delays, the Fund comments.

The exchange rate anchor keeps inflation under control, but the fiscal deficit rose 2 percentage points of GDP to 4.5 per cent last year, and the 5 per cent current account gap is still high despite lower oil import costs. Combined international reserves are almost \$15bn, enough to cover over four months imports, with half held at the French Treasury to maintain the euro peg. As in the eurozone, many countries violate the 3 per cent of GDP budget deficit goal under joint norms monitored by the central bank, including tax revenue at 20 per cent that no member yet attains.

Monetary policy and the currency level at 655 to the euro are broadly aligned to meet the 3 per cent inflation target, but both interbank and government securities operations should be modernized, according to Fund analysis. Improved collateral procedures and electronic platforms, primary dealer licensing, member state credit ratings, and non-resident investor tax treatment are immediate recommendations.

Banking system vulnerabilities linger despite the phased transition from the Basel I to the Basel II and III regulatory frameworks by end-decade. Credit growth has averaged 15 per cent in recent years, with a quarter of assets sovereign-related despite increased private sector activity. Large borrower exposures exceed the ultimate 25 per cent of capital limit; non-performing loans are 15 per cent of the total; one in ten banks have negative equity as minimum share capital is doubled to CFAF 10bn in 2017. The regional bank supervisor lacks resolution power to close troubled lenders and is often blocked by national authorities, and deposit insurance and legal debt collection processes are not yet in effect.

Overhaul of the competitive environment is “urgent” with the countries ranking from 140 to 180 out of 189 tracked by the World Bank’s “Doing Business” yardstick, the review adds. Bottlenecks include property registration, construction permits, electricity access, and communications and transport infrastructure. WAEMU nations are behind African counterparts like Ghana, Rwanda and Tanzania in these categories, and poverty rates above 50 per cent also surpass peer norms.

Despite 725 micro-finance institutions in the zone, penetration is low relative to the core banking system and unlicensed providers proliferate. Financial inclusion overall, measured as the portion of the adult population with an account at any intermediary, is half Africa’s 30 per cent average.

The headline focus on combating terrorism has brought a rapid deployment US and European military force to the area in international community partnership. In parallel, shock troops of local and foreign experts could also be deployed to jolt financial markets and services out of their long-standing torpor as another overriding threat.

Gary Kleiman is senior partner, [Kleiman International Consultants](#), a global emerging economy and financial market advisory firm.

<http://blogs.ft.com/>

Ghana et Togo "prochaines cibles" d'attaques "terroristes"

Publié le 15/04/2016

Selon les mêmes services de renseignement, cité dans ce courrier, "la menace est renforcée par des informations (...) obtenues lors de l'interrogatoire d'un terroriste malien identifié comme étant le cerveau des attaques à Grand-Bassam en Côte d'Ivoire", pris en charge par les autorités ivoiriennes. SIA-KAMBOU/ AFP

Le Ghana et le Togo seront probablement la cible de nouvelles attaques islamistes, semblables à celles qui ont frappé récemment le Burkina Faso et la Côte d'Ivoire, met en garde un rapport des services de renseignement du Ghana (NSCS).

Le Ghana et le Togo seront probablement la cible de nouvelles attaques islamistes, semblables à celles qui ont frappé récemment le Burkina Faso et la Côte d'Ivoire, met en garde un rapport des services de renseignement du Ghana (NSCS). "Des renseignements rassemblés par le National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) indiquent que la possibilité d'une attaque terroriste dans le pays est réelle," affirme un message interne des services ghanéens de l'Immigration, daté du 9 avril et publié vendredi dans plusieurs médias ghanéens.

Ce message, consulté par l'AFP, fait état d'un rapport du NSCS. Et "selon le rapport, peut-on lire, le Ghana et le Togo sont les prochaines cibles après les attaques au Burkina Faso et en Côte d'Ivoire". La Côte d'Ivoire est frontalière du Ghana, qui est à son tour voisin du Togo. Selon les mêmes services de renseignement, cité dans ce courrier, "la menace est renforcée par des informations (...) obtenues lors de l'interrogatoire d'un terroriste malien identifié comme étant le cerveau des attaques à Grand-Bassam en Côte d'Ivoire", pris en charge par les autorités ivoiriennes.

Le dimanche 13 mars, trois assaillants avaient remonté la plage de Grand-Bassam, proche d'Abidjan et très prisée des Ivoiriens et des étrangers, tirant au hasard et attaquant plusieurs restaurants. Ils avaient tué 19 personnes, dont quatre Français, et en avaient blessé une vingtaine d'autres. Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi) avait revendiqué l'attaque, ainsi que celle qui a fait 30 morts en janvier dans la capitale burkinabè, Ouagadougou. D'après l'analyse faite par le NSCS, le choix du Ghana irait à l'encontre de "l'impression selon laquelle seuls les pays francophones seraient visés".

Au vu de ces éléments, les services ghanéens de l'Immigration appellent leurs agents à "plus de vigilance" aux frontières, notamment aux "points d'entrée non approuvés" et à la frontière nord avec le Burkina Faso. Dans le message interne consulté par l'AFP, les services de l'Immigration ajoutent que les contrôles de personnes en provenance de pays à "haut risque" comme la Libye, le Niger et le Mali devront être renforcés. Lors de l'attaque en Côte d'Ivoire, les attaquants étaient en effet arrivés depuis le Mali dans un véhicule enregistré au Niger.

Le président du Ghana John Dramani Mahama a déclaré vendredi que "tous les pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest courent le risque" d'être attaqués. Le Ghana, le Togo, le Burkina Faso, le Mali et le Niger font partie de la Communauté économique des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (Cédéao), dont les ressortissants peuvent voyager dans les pays membres sans visa.

<http://www.parismatch.com/>

Libya

Libyan smuggling route grows 1 year after mass drowning



African illegal migrants wait to receive medical assistance after being rescued by coastal guards on a port in Tripoli, Libya, Monday, April 11, 2016. (AP)

The Associated Press Sunday, 17 April 2016

When more than 800 people drowned last year on an overcrowded ship bound for Italy's southernmost isle of Lampedusa, the European Union deployed a round-the-clock flotilla that has saved thousands of lives on what remains one of the world's most perilous journeys.

But one year after Europe's deadliest migrant disaster, humanitarian and security efforts off the lawless coast of Libya face a growing challenge to catch smugglers and bring asylum-seekers to safety. Experts say crackdowns on migration at other EU borders mean that the southern Mediterranean crossing plied daily by smugglers operating out of Libya already is busier now than it was 12 months ago.

So far this year, 24,000 migrants have arrived in Italy via this route and tens of thousands more are waiting in the pipeline, according to the International Organization for Migration.

Rescue officials seek to ensure no repeat of the night of April 18, 2015, when a boat packed with an estimated 850 mostly African passengers capsized as a civilian freighter approached. Most were locked below decks; only 28 survived. Several other smuggling vessels sank in the first months of 2015, some without trace at a cost of untold lives, before EU naval reinforcements arrived that June to cast a safety net.

Experts say that net is fragile.

"There could be a shipwreck tomorrow. Two boats could collide on the high seas. Even a strong multinational presence can't provide a 100 percent safety net," said Federico Soda, director of the IOM's office in Rome, which oversees the central Mediterranean and North Africa.

Most of those 24,000 migrants were scooped up by Italian coast guard and EU vessels from recklessly overloaded vessels that were left drifting, engines dead, between Libya and Italy in a body of water dubbed the Lampedusa Triangle. Even if their amateur pilots had the requisite navigation skills, few vessels carry enough fuel to complete the approximately 300-kilometer (185-mile) crossing to Lampedusa from Libya.

Soda said about 350 people have died so far this year trying to cross the southern Mediterranean route, nearly as many deaths over the same period as the far busier smuggling routes between Turkey and the eastern islands of Greece.

Now, as EU authorities work to halt that eastern Mediterranean flow of migrants and deport them from Greece back to Turkey, analysts anticipate that asylum-seekers from the Mideast and Asia may see Libya once again as the most temptingly open gateway to Europe.

They note that Libya's paramilitary chaos may make the North African nation a particularly attractive launching point for Europe-bound migrants because EU authorities won't deport migrants back to such a danger zone. Virtually all of this year's arrivals from Libya have been Africans - but observers say that could be about to change.

"We should expect tens of thousands to attempt to depart this spring and summer bound for Lampedusa. With the closure of the EU-Turkey border to migrants, we may learn once again how closing one route pushes people to another route," said Matteo de Bellis, an Amnesty International researcher who just completed a fact-finding mission to Italy's main migrant processing center on Lampedusa.

"Even with the best search-and-rescue framework in place, we must expect hundreds of more deaths this year. When you pack 100 people or more into a rubber dinghy for what is arguably the most dangerous crossing of them all it will never be possible to save everyone," de Bellis said.

EU nations are maintaining a fleet anchored primarily in Lampedusa that operates under the codename Operation Sophia. It includes Italy's largest warship, the aircraft carrier Cavour, and is commanded by an Italian rear admiral, Enrico Credendino. It uses surveillance aircraft and satellite imagery to identify boats leaving Libya's shores, particularly Zuwara west of Tripoli and Misrata to the east, and pounces on them once they exit Libyan territorial waters.

The fleet's official mission is to confront smugglers and deter illegal immigration to Italy, but in practice the effort has become one of the 28-nation bloc's biggest rescue missions in its history. It works in tandem with an older search-and-rescue effort codenamed Operation Triton overseen by the EU border agency Frontex, which deploys ships to rescue migrants from the seas nearer Sicily and Malta.

On Monday, these two operations rescued more than 2,000 people from eight boats that had been spotted by a Luxembourg-provided surveillance plane. A Norwegian vessel took 898 migrants to Sicily, including 224 children, while a German ship delivered 738 others to Lampedusa. Doctors on board the Cavour performed a life-saving abdominal operation on an African man airlifted onto the carrier. The U.N. Security Council in October empowered the EU fleet to begin arresting smugglers and seizing their craft in international waters north of Libya. The force temporarily grew to nine ships, a submarine, three surveillance aircraft, five helicopters and a drone as it destroyed 67 smuggler boats and arrested 46 smugglers, according to Credendino's January report on the fleet's first six months.

Credendino suggested that smugglers were increasingly relying on rigid inflatable craft - many of them ordered from China and shipped to Libya via Turkey and Malta - rather than larger wooden vessels, because of the fleet's seizure and destruction of larger craft. He noted that around 8 percent of the smuggled travelers had started their sea journey on Egypt's coast, choosing to travel west for rescue by the EU fleet.

His report pointed to the need to rebuild a credible Libyan government that would allow EU ships into Libyan waters and EU law officials into the ports themselves to confront smugglers more decisively. He wrote that the EU naval force could not safely end its deployment before helping to create "a capable and well-resourced Libyan coast guard."

Analysts, however, say Libya is nowhere close to being a stable partner, with three rival governments still feuding in Tripoli and the eastern port of Tobruk. The United Nations-backed "unity" government has only recently returned to Tripoli from exile in neighboring Tunisia but remains confined to a naval base defended by a militia and can enter and leave the country only by boat.

"Europe cannot solve the problem in the central Mediterranean on its own. It needs a stable government in Libya," Soda said. "Until that day comes, this migrant route will keep producing tragedies."

<http://english.alarabiya.net/>

Nigeria

US 'training forces' to fight Boko Haram

The US ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power has pledged support to countries involved in the fight against Boko Haram Islamists. Power made the statement while in Nigeria, having visited Chad and Cameroon.



The three countries have been battling the Islamists who have terrorized parts of northern Nigerian and neighboring Cameroon.

DW spoke to Ryan Cummings, director of the South African risk analysis group Signal Risk who believes the visit by an American top diplomat to the Lake Chad basin sends a strong signal to Boko Haram that the international community is committed to end their terrorist activities.

DW: How significant is her visit to the three countries?

Ryan Cummings: I think it's a kind of reinforcement that the United State and other foreign governments are supportive of operations that aim at uprooting the Boko Haram Islamists. I think it's also a kind of recognition that the Boko Haram threat has evolved and expanded outside of Northeastern Nigeria and become an issue of regional propositions which needs not only a regional but an international response.

Why has the United States been reluctant to help Nigeria fight Boko Haram and instead chose to support Cameroon with 300 troops?

I think we need to look at the relations between the Nigerian and the US government. They [relations] were earlier strained during former President Goodluck Jonathan's regime accused the US government of failing to sell the weapons that the Nigerian government needed in the fight against Boko Haram. It was stated that the US government were concerned and reluctant to sell the Nigerian military any form of weaponry due to the long standing claims of human right abuses by the army in the fight against Boko Haram and also in operations elsewhere.



Ryan Cummings, director of the South African risk analysis group Signal Risk

When Mohammed Buhari took over the presidency; there was emphasis on looking at strengthening relations with a lot of international countries, the US being one of them.

They are supplying armies not only to Cameroon but to Niger as well. However, these forces are not taking part in any combat operations. What they are doing is specializing in the training of counterterrorism forces of the respective countries with similar deployment taking place including to Nigeria following the Chibok kidnapping.

With a crackdown on freedom of protest and a government decision to shut down the internet and text messaging throughout Chad for several days during election time, do you think the US is in a difficult position to partner with a dictator in the fight against Boko Haram?

To a certain extent it's a difficult compromise. I think Idris Deby is an ally to many governments specifically the French. He is a key partner in fighting insecurity in the region.

During Samantha Powers' visit, President Deby said Washington and other foreign powers are partly to be blamed for the Boko Haram threat. What is your take on that?

I think it's easy to point fingers. We can look at international powers and look at foreign interventions within certain contexts and the repercussions of foreign interventions have had in facilitating the creation of groups especially the Islamic state. I find it difficult to see foreign intervention in Nigeria beyond British colonial rule as in any way influencing the development of Boko Haram

The same situation is seen in Cameroon, with Paul Biya in power for over three decades. Is the US just there to talk about the joint effort to fight Boko Haram or are they also voicing their concerns against the oppressive regime?

I think it's very much a dual approach. The United States will always have key partners across the world and specifically within the African context. These key partners need to espouse the levels of democratization that the US itself is a key custodian of and a key promoter of, and we are just not seeing that. The problem is that the reason Deby and Biya have become key partners in the fight against regional instability is because of their longevity within their specific countries. Because they have created key nexuses between various stakeholders in the region - is how they are able to ensure that they can respond to issues of insecurity.

Ryan Cummings, is the Director of the South African risk analysis group Signal Risk

Interview: Temitope Omolade

<http://www.dw.com/en/us-training-forces-to-fight-boko-haram/a-19206253>

Nigeria: Boko Haram - FG Seeks Support for 80,000 Displaced Nigerians in Cameroon

17 April 2016

As part of efforts to receive over 80,000 displaced Nigerians who were displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency and are taking refuge in Cameroon Republic, the Federal Government has inspected the proposed site where the deportees would be hosted in Adamawa state.

The proposed site is the permanent site of the Adamawa State Polytechnic abandoned for more two decades situated at Konawaya village, a suburb of Yola the state capital, with the aim at rebuilding and making it conducive enough to accommodate the expected deportees.

While speaking in Yola yesterday, the Senior Special Assistant to President Muhammadu Buhari on Policy, Development and Analysis, Ibrahim Bapetel who represented the Secretary to the Federal Government, Babachir David Lawal told journalists that the number of deportees expected is large hence adequate preparation has to be put in place before their arrival on Nigerian soil.

He urged various stakeholders to prepare a comprehensive needs report for onward transmission to the federal government, adding that due to the federal government's concern over the plight of the deportees he was optimistic that the needs report would be treated with dispatch.

Bapetel noted that the size of the deportees was so large, urging international donors to also come to the assistance of the federal government in addressing the myriads challenges that would accrue in handling the deportees.

Also the Adamawa state government has called on the federal government as well as International Donor agencies to come to the rescue of the state, noting that the state government cannot single-handedly shoulder the responsibilities of catering for the teeming deportees.

The call came through the state's commissioner for information, Mr. Ahmed Sajoh when he, alongside the federal government delegation, visited the proposed site where the deportees would be hosted.

Sajoh noted that the call has become imperative in view of the sheer size of the deportees and the nature of the proposed camp which he said needed complete rehabilitation.

He noted that even providing perimeter fencing on the facility would cost the state enormous funds besides providing other basic infrastructure, noting that the state government has serious financial constraint facing it, especially in consideration of the cash crunch facing the country.

<http://allafrica.com/stories/201604170167.html>

Somalia

Shabaab video raises questions over AMISOM's base defence

18 April 2016



A still from the video shows Shabaab fighters firing as they walk towards Kenyan positions that are covered in orange tarpaulins. Source: Al-Kataib

A video released by the Somali militant group Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen on 9 April depicting an attack on an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base suggests the Kenyan defenders were well-armed yet put up little resistance.

The 48-minute high-resolution video showed militants overrunning the AMISOM base at El-Adde (Ceel Cadde) on 15 January. The Kenyan authorities have acknowledged the attack took place, but have refused to disclose how many soldiers were killed or captured. A spokesman for the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) has dismissed claims that nearly 200 died.

The Shabaab video gave no precise death toll, but showed many dead Kenyan soldiers, saying more than 100 had been killed. Six soldiers - several of them clearly seriously wounded - were captured and interviewed for the video. The Shabaab said some of the captives subsequently succumbed to their injuries.

The video appeared to show that the defending force, which was largely drawn from the 9th Battalion Kenya Rifles, was heavily armed. A cache of weapons it showed as having been captured in the battle included 10 mortars (two 120 mm, three 81 mm, and five 60 mm calibre), three 12.7 mm DShK heavy machine guns, at least 12 general-purpose and light machine guns (five FN MAG, four PK-series, two IWI Neg-ev, and one 7.62 mm BREN), at least four RPG-7 rocket launchers, two 84 mm Carl

Gustav recoilless rifles, and dozens of G3 and M4 small arms.

All these weapons are known to be in KDF service. While the Shabaab fighters may have added some of their own weapons to this stockpile, they would have found it difficult to obtain the European-, US-, and Israeli-made ones from other sources.

The Kenyan infantry was supported by armoured vehicles, including at least two AML-60/90 armoured cars, a WZ551 armoured personnel carrier, and an M26 Puma mine-resistant ambush protected vehicle (MRAP).

<http://www.janes.com/article/>

Al-Shabaab going under: Militants face worst year ever

April 16, 2016



Al-Shabaab fighters in Somalia. PHOTO: Reuters

Year 2016 will go down on record as *annus horribilis* for the Somalia-based al-Qaeda affiliated militant group, al-Shabaab. The first quarter of this year, particularly last month, was the bloodiest for al-Shabaab in a long time.

It lost 10 commanders, and hundreds of foot soldiers and middle-level commanders to enemy forces including, American and African Union Mission to Somalia (Amisom) troops as well as the Somali National Army in Somalia.

There are reports that an attack on the militants' headquarters at Jilib last Thursday could have claimed a few more senior commanders.

Initial reports indicated that 20 were killed, but their identity and rank was not clear. The terror group is under intense military pressure from all sides—from the ground, the air and the sea and has very few options left for its survival. And given all these forces allied against it, it's losing large swathes of territory in Somalia.

It is not surprising that things are getting tougher for al-Shabaab. An analysis of MEA Risk's terror heat maps in East Africa between January and March shows a high concentration of terror events in Somalia.

The maps also show a high concentration of security and defence operations in the country. There were 138 security and defence operation in the quarter to March 31, last year.

Of these 74 or 54 per cent happened in Somalia, accounting for 94 per cent or 776 of the 823 deaths of insurgents caused by defence and security operations in East Afri-

ca during that period.

On the other hand, there were 115 terrorist events in East Africa, with 67 or 58.3 per cent of the activities occurring in Somalia. In terms of deaths caused by terror attacks, Somalia came second to the equally unstable Sudan. Sudan accounted for 479 or 64 per cent of the 753 deaths caused by terrorist activities while Somalia accounted for 229 or 30 per cent.

Shabaab besieged In the MEA Risk incidents index, terror related activities in Somalia were rated at 2.42/5.00 meaning that al- Shabaab is still packing hard punches in Somalia. However, security and defence-related events scored 2.45/5.00 meaning al-Shabaab is being outgunned.

That is not good news for the terror outfit, since it is losing both in territory, human resources and hardware. It appears besieged and left without elbow room. This feeling of being boxed in could be one of the reasons Shabaab attacks Puntland and Galmudug states in Somalia. The two states responded to this provocation with a sledge hammer, leaving hundreds of militants dead and others arrested.

Apart from the two states, al- Shabaab is also facing pressure in other quarters. For instance, in just one week in March , a report by the Uganda's Daily Monitor says, Amisom forces put out the battlefield – military lingo for killed- seven Shabaab commanders, the latest being Abdurashir Bugdube, who was gunned down last week.

Bugdube led the September 2015 attack on Janaale Amisom camp in which 19 Ugandan soldiers were neutralised. Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) have also extracted their pound of flesh from the same group.

At least three top commanders, including Mohammed Karatey, who was blamed for the EL-Adde camp attack in which an unknown number of KDF soldiers were killed in January 15.

Karatey, who was officiating a graduation ceremony was decimated with 52 others including middle level commanders. A few days later, suspected IED expert, Maalim Sheriff was also killed alongside 20 others. The US forces struck Ramos killing 150 insurgents including senior officers last month.

Days later a US drone attack neutralised Hassan Ali Dhoore and two others at Jilib in southern Somalia not far from the Kenyan border, the officials said.

In total, in a space of six weeks al-Shabaab has lost 10 high-level human assets in addition to the rank and file soldiers whose death toll exceeded 300 in March alone.

The worst carnage happened in Suuj valley in Puntland where 167 militants were neutralised in four days of fighting to recover territory from al Shabaab. Also the fight in Galmudug state also claimed 115 of operatives and saw 100 others arrested.

<http://zipo.co.ke/>

International Organizations

EU

The Strategic Interests of the European Union

April 20, 2016 Schuman Foundation

European strategic interests exist and are visible to all, but their impact on world affairs remains limited in contrast to Europe's theoretical influence in the international arena.

Logically the analysis of the European Union's interests should not be a problem. Due to Europe's position in the world, its action in terms of the major challenges facing our societies (environment, energy, information society, terrorism, etc...) and its profile within major international organisations, it is quite easy to establish a strategic agenda for the Union without this causing any controversy. Frequently then, in the past, this exercise has been successfully undertaken. But the reality of the matter is that beyond such descriptions, which are often for academic use, European players – Member States and institutions – have hardly felt concerned by such agendas, since the feeling of common European interest is still weakly shared, if not contested, by those who primarily look to their own interests.



PIERRE VIMONT
SENIOR ASSOCIATE
CARNEGIE EUROPE

In other words, European strategic interests exist and are visible to all, but their impact on world affairs remains singularly limited in contrast to the theoretic influence of Europe in the international arena. In order to be operational and concrete Europe's common interests have to be perceived and accepted as such by the Europeans themselves. The problem is that they often seem to be the last ones to be able or who want to do so.

A Strategic Agenda for Europe

The mention of major challenges faced today by the international community logically provides a framework for Europe's strategic agenda. There is not one single crisis or global issue that does not concern the European Union in one way or another. In short, the list of the Union's strategic interests can be laid out as follows:

In the economic field

In the economic field Europe faces increasingly strong competition on the part of the emerging countries and also traditional partners. For the Union this new situation implies both a more offensive trade policy, greater innovative and research capabilities, and more generally, renewed commitment to the modernisation of the economic and social model on which the nations of Europe have relied for over fifty years. To underpin on-going work (the Juncker Plan for the revival of investments, trade nego-

tiations with the USA over the TTIP, realignment of government finances under the Economic and Monetary Union, Energy Union, etc...) European leaders should be looking for a new balance between social protection and economic competitiveness. The task is obviously being made harder in a context of weak growth and given the political and social resistance that this vital renewal is encountering. But the strategic issue at stake is there, and it is in the common interest of all Europeans.

In the diplomatic field

In the diplomatic field Europe has to take on board, in the drafting of its strategy, the regional and local crises that we see on a daily basis around the world. Not that it absolutely has to be involved in each of these, but each of these crises in their own way impacts the Union and obliges it to take into account these situations of rupture and upheaval.

First and foremost there is the European Union's neighbourhood: firstly the countries of Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus) and the Southern Caucasus (Georgie, Armenia, Azerbaijan), not forgetting those of Central Asia, whose growing links with the Union should lead to more thought about the type of relationship we want to have with them in the future. Then there are our partners in the Southern Mediterranean (Maghreb and Middle East) which have been subject to great change over the last five years, in the wake of the so-called "Arab Spring" and which ranges from political instability to civil war. To this first circle we must add the countries of the Gulf and also probably the African States of the Sahel and other regions of Africa (Gulf of Guinea, Horn of Africa) which we all know are facing the same challenge of instability and insecurity, and for whom aid remains in a natural way with Europe, when it comes to asking for political support and financial or technical assistance. This neighbourhood, in the "wide" sense of the term, represents a priority for Europe due to its geographic proximity and also due to the pressure of events that have turned these regions into the most exposed to the greatest amount of conflict and danger.

Opposite these imbalances, the other challenges faced by Europeans are of a different nature: they lie in the various cooperation agreements that Europe would like to continue to develop with its main strategic partners: USA, Russia, China, Japan, India, South Africa, Brazil and many others, who are knocking on Brussels' door in order to strengthen their relations. It is a paradox however that this "demand for Europe" is constantly renewed in contrast to Europeans who have increasing doubts about themselves. Finally the need to consolidate relations with regional organisations comes under Europe's strategic diplomatic goals (African Union, League of Arab States, ASEM, etc.), including the UN and its various agencies, which constitute natural partners for Europe with whom it often shares the same goals and vision of the world.

Europe and major global challenges

Finally regarding major global challenges Europe can also include amongst its strategic interests the themes that the international community has placed on its agenda over the last few months: terrorism, sustainable development, climate change, immigration, information society, etc... The Union has provided a significant and often appreciated contribution to all of these issues. But it is clear that the most difficult part remains to be done and Europeans are going to have to step up their action and ability in order to promote more effective response that will get to the root of the

imbalances we are facing. In this regard the phenomenon of immigration, which grew to the level we all witnessed at the end of 2015, is a major challenge for the Europeans due to its extent, its complexity and because it certainly is going to be a reality that Europe will have to face for a long time to come: beyond the Syrian or Iraqi problem, refugees and immigrants will continue to come due to the limits of economic development or the deregulation of the climate seen in South East Asia and Africa. In the new century this reality truly is a significant challenge to Europe. All of these challenges define the outline of a rather welcome European foreign policy strategy. At last this will have tangible content and should no longer be rejected since the European Union's interests seem clear in this context and result from an analysis shared by all. If we think about this further we might even be able to say that the common interest of all Europeans especially lies in the stability and security of the regions on the EU's periphery, both in the East and the South, and this neighbourhood, which is dominated by civil war (Libya and Syria), armed conflict (Ukraine), trafficking of all sorts (Sahel) and the presence of increasingly radical groups (Sinai, Nigeria), is clearly the most dangerous place for the Union and the rallying point for the defence of our common interests as well. In this context ongoing work to provide a new shape to relations with vital partners like Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia seem to illustrate this need for shared goals within the European Union.

Common European Interests: Fragile New Awareness

And so from where does this diffuse impression come that this is not the case, and that the awareness by the Union's Member States of common interests, shared by all and defining a line of action to which each one could commit with determination, remains extremely fragile if not inexistent? The reasons for this are various:

Values and interests

From the way it has been constructed the European Union has always preferred to leave defence of what is usually called "interests" to its Member States and to concentrate on the promotion of "values": Human Rights of course but also humanitarian action, dialogue with civil society. According to Brussels' idea of diplomacy, interests, even the strategic ones, are the realm of "hard power" and of geopolitical reality; they are the prerogative of the States and that of traditional diplomacy and alliances between nations, a legacy of the Westphalian tradition. At best then it is business that will, out of preference, be left to the Member States, the apostles of «realpolitik». Values for their part, belong to the rule of law and humanitarian principles; in short they come under "soft power" and could be part of the base that might unite all of the Union's members whilst national interests are inherently antagonistic and divisive. This is mainly the Commission's reality. This binary manner of perceiving foreign policy in fact restricts the diplomacy of Europe's institutions to a limited albeit significant role: trade agreements, development aid, humanitarian aid, dialogue over Human Rights etc... It especially reduces it to the point that there is no geopolitical vision.

The absence of any geopolitical analysis on the part of the European Union

Hence there is a permanent weakness in most of the strategies developed by the European Union's institutions, lying precisely in the fact that they are not real strategies, since there is no significant geopolitical analysis. Therefore the Eastern Part-

nership carefully avoids the issue of relations with Russia; policy regarding our Mediterranean neighbours is void of any in-depth thought about the type of dialogue that should be developed with the region's main actors (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, etc.). Procedures are put forward (association agreement monitoring), principles are delivered (differentiation), instruments are developed (simplified action plans) but all of this provides the feeling of a political and strategic vacuum from which all power dynamics, antagonisms and lines of division between nations have been sucked out. There is no history to European strategies, they are smooth; procedures are rolled out in which security and stability goals are not really defined and the action provided for is distant from the reality of the field.

Differing national visions of the EU's role in the world

Finally the main weakness is that Europe still finds it hard to see itself as a fully-fledged actor in the international arena. The reasons for this lacuna are well-known: far from sharing a joint idea about what the role of the European Union is or might be in the world, the 28 Member States sustain completely opposite views on this, depending on their past or their respective political, diplomatic or economic influence in the world. If we simply look at the "largest" European countries, their positions on the idea of "European power" - because this is the issue in hand - are all extremely different: ranging from hostile (UK), often hesitant (Germany), and increasingly ambiguous from France's point of view, although it did champion this cause in the past.

In the face of so many contradictions we should not be surprised that the European Union too often appears as an absent or vague actor. Even without pretending to substitute its members' national diplomacy, which would be unrealistic, Europe seems to struggle in setting out a complementary foreign policy to that of the States. A Strategic Vision for the Union around Common Interests: on what Conditions?

Making a realistic definition of the goals and providing the necessary means to achieve them

Might we hope to provide meaning to the idea of common interest and strategic vision for the European Union? Is it possible to develop awareness amongst Europeans in support of a responsible, autonomous, active role within the community of nations? The exercise underway and requested by the heads of State and government of Federica Mogherini at the European Council of June 2015, which aims to set out a foreign policy and security strategy for the European Union over the next few years provides us with an opportunity to do this at least. Twelve years after the strategy laid out by Javier Solana, which succeeded in providing the European Union with significant credibility, the High Representative/Vice President for European Foreign and Security Policy has started the draft of a new strategy firstly with the launch of a wide debate between Member States, research centres and civil society. The process deserves our attention: if it is undertaken seriously and does not attempt to avoid difficult issues it might at least open up debate to force Europeans to look reality in the eye.

To this end the consultation now on-going should avoid certain pitfalls encountered

in the past and establish some precise points of reference.

Firstly, realism: Europe cannot pretend to decisive influence over the entire international community. In a world of multiple centres of power of which we are all aware, Europeans have to sustain ambitions on a level with their means and joint will. The goals announced in the past of a European defence system provided with impressive capabilities (60,000 men) ready to be deployed simultaneously in three theatres of operation did not impress anyone for any length of time, since it did not become a reality; however it did weaken confidence placed in Europe and led to doubts about its ability to act. It would be better to be humble in the present stage of European integration rather than define a direction, which is clearly unattainable for the time being.

Then for priorities: Europe has to be able to define a limited number of goals that are in line with its most urgent interests. Because it has dispersed itself so much the Union's action is in danger of being inconsistent. At present Europe has to make choices and focus its effort there, where it is most necessary: bring stability back to a neighbourhood that is in flames, "review" a transatlantic partnership that requires a new dynamic as we are on the eve of a change at the White House, and find the kind of relationship (not naïve but realistic) to develop with Russia in the context of the Ukrainian crisis and other uncertainties in the future.

Finally means and regularity: in the vision that it aims to set out for its future, Europe cannot ignore the weaknesses it revealed in the past. Too often Europe has committed to decisions that have never been followed-up in effect, due to an inability to mobilise the necessary resources for their implementation and a lack of sustained effort in the projects and operations set in place: development programmes that are finalised too quickly, when in fact it would be better to be more patient, civil or military operations in the area of security which are slowly waning due to a lack of determination and commitment on the part of Member States.

The new European foreign and security policy strategy: a primordial deadline
But we must not be mistaken: the pitfalls are formidable. These are the same as those which shaped the European Union's often wanting international image when major international events called for it. At the same time, it is vital to recall that the responsibility of this kind of weakness lies as much with the Member States, which are not too concerned about providing the Union with the means for true diplomacy.

The deadline set for the summer of 2016 for the adoption of the strategy asked of Federica Mogherini must therefore be deemed primordial. It might indeed be seen as a "return to basics" for European diplomacy, if it succeeds in returning to the drawing board in the quest for answers to basic questions:

which goals do we set for the Union's foreign policy in view of its common interests?

which means will it be given to fulfil these goals?

which methods will be applied to undertake this strategy? In particular should we encourage greater flexibility in the implementation of European diplomacy and

allow some Member States to take the initiative?

Here we do not mean to lay out in detail the various themes, but simply to stress that without some methodical thought, it is highly unlikely that the Union will be able to develop its own strategy so that it can play its role to the full in the world arena. Lucidity obliges us also to say that this wager is far from being won. Indeed experience has accustomed us to seeing Member States ducking out of difficult debates, preferring expedients to real, in-depth reform.

Two final considerations might provide us with hope.

The first is linked to the crises that Europe is facing: Ukraine, Syria, Libya, immigration, terrorism, etc... Overwhelmingly the list grows and each time the Union is placed in an uncomfortable position. These repeated tests are also starting to affect the very principles on which Europe has been built, if we consider the challenges made to principles as vital as that of solidarity and doubts expressed about the future of the Schengen system. Given these developments everyone within the European institutions and even amongst a growing number of Member States, are urging for a necessary awakening and for in-depth debate.

The other reason for hope lies with public opinions itself. Paradoxically, at a time when there is growing scepticism about European integration, foreign policy is one of the rare areas of public action for which our fellow citizens say they support greater European integration, thereby seeming to admit the existence of European common interest. History has taught us that popular support is not always enough to take Europe forward; it has also taught us that the Union has sometimes progressed in spite of reticent public opinion. But it is preferable, when all is said and done, to feel that European diplomacy enjoys the support of the public at a time when commitment is being made in the quest of a foreign policy, a sign of true progress.

[This article is part of *The Schuman Report on Europe, State of the Union 2016* and was originally published by the Schuman Foundation.](#)

<http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=63448>

The ISIS Threat To Southeast Asia – Analysis

APRIL 30, 2016

The ISIS terrorist threat to Southeast Asia is not as great as that from a rejuvenated Jemaah Islamiyah which has a more extensive network in the region.

By Joseph CY Liow*

Appearing before a US Congressional Subcommittee on Counter Terrorism and Intelligence on 27 April 2016, I gave an assessment of the ISIS threat in Southeast Asia. I began with the observation that terrorism was not a new phenomenon in the region but went as far back as the era of anti-colonial struggle. It gathered pace after 9/11 with a series of attacks perpetrated mostly by the Al-Qaeda linked Jemaah Islamiyah. I continued:

Against this backdrop, recent ISIS-inspired attacks in Jakarta and the southern Philippines serve as a timely reminder of the threat that terrorism continues to pose to Southeast Asian societies.

Three related forms of threat

Related to ISIS, the threat takes three forms.

First, the danger of attacks perpetrated by local groups or individuals inspired by ISIS. These groups or individuals might not have direct links to ISIS central. Rather, they possess local grievances, for which the abstraction that is ISIS provides impetus and inspiration, usually via the internet. Jakarta was an example of this.

Second, the threat posed by returnees from Syria and Iraq. In particular, the possibility that hardened militants would be returning with battlefield experience and operational knowledge to either plan or mount attacks in the region. But this has not yet happened. Thus far, the returnees in custody are deportees who failed in their attempt to get to Syria and Iraq.

Third, the threat posed by militants who will soon be released from prison. At issue is the weak prison system in Indonesia, and the radicalization that occurs within prisons. We should bear in mind though, that not all of these soon-to-be released militants are ISIS supporters or sympathizers. In fact, the vast majority are members of militant groups known to be anti-ISIS.

So, how serious is the threat posed by ISIS? The threat is certainly real and warrants our attention for reasons I just mentioned. But at the same time, we must take care not to exaggerate it. Let me make three points:

One, when we speak of ISIS in Southeast Asia, we have to be mindful of the fact that at present, there is no such thing as an “ISIS Southeast Asia,” nor has ISIS central formally declared an interest in any Southeast Asian country. For the most part, we are dealing with radical groups and individuals who have on their own taken oaths of allegiance to ISIS.

Two, the number of Southeast Asians fighting in Iraq and Syria remains compara-

tively small. We are talking of, at most, 700, mostly from Indonesia. By way of comparison, thousands are coming from Europe. In addition to this, a large proportion of Southeast Asians there – I would say around 40 percent – comprise women and children.

Three, in our anxiety over ISIS, we must be careful not to miss the forest for the trees. There are multiple militant groups operating in Southeast Asia. Many are at odds with each other; not all seek affiliation to, or are enamored of, ISIS. In fact, I would argue that the greater, long-term threat comes from a rejuvenated Jemaah Islamiyah, which has a larger network and is better funded than the pro-ISIS groups in the region.

Terrorism in Southeast Asia

What about terrorism in Southeast Asia more generally?

Here too, it is imperative that we keep things in perspective. Yes, for Southeast Asia today, the question of terrorist attacks is, unfortunately, no longer a matter of “if”, but “when.” Even if the influence of ISIS diminishes over time, and it will, terrorism is part of the lay of the land and will not be eradicated anytime soon.

But, terrorism –whether perpetrated by ISIS or Jemaah Islamiyah – is not an existential threat to Southeast Asian societies. All indicators are that from an operational perspective, the threat remains at a low level. Of course, given the resilient and evolutionary nature of terrorism, this situation might well change. As I alluded to earlier, one possible factor that could prompt a change is a deliberate shift of attention of ISIS central to Southeast Asia. This however, seems unlikely for now as ISIS is pre-occupied with its immediate priority of holding ground in Iraq and Syria, and expanding its fight to Libya and Europe.

A final observation. Without being complacent, we should also recognize that regional governments are today better equipped and prepared to deal with the threat compared to a decade and a half ago, although capacity can, and should, be further improved with cooperation among themselves, and with some help from the United States.

**Joseph CY Liow is Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University and currently Lee Kuan Yew chair in Southeast Asian Studies at Brookings Institute, Washington DC*

<http://www.eurasiareview.com/>

Belgium

Les terroristes viseraient des plages cet été



Des plages prises pour cibles ? Le quotidien Bild l'affirme.

Quatre semaines après les attentats meurtriers qui ont fait 32 morts et 340 blessés à Bruxelles, Paul Van Tigchelt, directeur de l'Ocam – Organe de coordination pour l'analyse de la menace, un organisme placé sous la tutelle du ministère de l'Intérieur belge – a averti ce mardi que des «combattants étrangers» prévoient de nouveaux attentats en Europe. «Il y a beaucoup de renseignements, par exemple des signaux que des FTT (*Foreign terrorist fighters*), des combattants en Syrie, voudraient retourner, pas seulement vers la Belgique, mais vers l'Europe, pour commettre un attentat», a-t-il déclaré lors d'une conférence presse.

Terroristes déguisés en marchands ambulants

Et ces combattants étrangers de Daech pourraient cibler... des plages à en croire le quotidien allemand *Bild*. Des régions côtières de l'Italie, de la France et de l'Espagne seraient ainsi dans le viseur de Daech. Des plages touristiques, notamment sur la côte sud de la France et la région de la Costa del Sol en Espagne, pourraient constituer des cibles comme la plage de Sousse en Tunisie l'an dernier où s'était déroulée

une sanglante attaque faisant 38 morts.

Selon *Bild*, cette menace a été identifiée par les services de renseignement italiens qui auraient puisé leurs informations auprès de sources africaines. Les Italiens auraient ensuite communiqué ces informations aux services allemands. Selon ces informations, les terroristes essaieront de se faire passer pour des marchands de souvenirs et de boissons. Les terroristes à l'origine de ces menaces seraient de nationalité sénégalaise, en liaison avec le groupe terroriste Boko Haram qui sévit au Nigeria et dans certaines régions de pays voisins. En 2015, Boko Haram a prêté allégeance à Daech et s'est rebaptisée Province ouest-africaine de l'État islamique. Mardi soir, les autorités italiennes ont toutefois démenti les informations de *Bild*. La semaine dernière, le quotidien espagnol *El Mundo* a cependant rapporté qu'une cache d'armes appartenant aux combattants d'un groupe faisant partie de Daech avait été découverte à Ceuta, l'enclave espagnole en Afrique.

<http://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2016/04/22/>

Daech voudrait attaquer des plages en Europe

Les autorités belges ont affirmé que des «combattants étrangers» de l'EI voudraient retourner, pas seulement vers la Belgique, mais vers l'Europe, pour commettre un attentat.



Des informations ont été reçues selon lesquelles des nouveaux combattants de l'État islamique voudraient retourner en Europe, a indiqué mardi l'Ocam. (photo: AFP)

Un attentat sur une plage bondée de la Méditerranée durant l'été: telle est la nouvelle crainte des services secrets de certains pays de l'Union européenne. Un an après une attaque dans la station balnéaire tunisienne de Sousse, les régions côtières de l'Italie, la France et l'Espagne seraient la cible potentielle de combattants du groupe État islamique (EI), indique mardi *Bild*, citant le renseignement allemand. Les autorités italiennes estiment que des assaillants déguisés en vendeurs ambulants pourraient attaquer une plage densément peuplée.

D'autres sources indiquent que le danger viendrait de sympathisants sénégalais de Boko Haram. Ce groupe terroriste nigérian a fait allégeance à l'EI l'année passée. *Bild* cite un rapport du chef de la police d'une ville sénégalaise, qui explique pourquoi il est si difficile de contrôler les allées et venues des vendeurs ambulants. «En raison de leurs activités commerciales et pour leur réapprovisionnement en marchandises, des hommes font la navette de façon régulière entre l'Italie et l'Afrique. Et c'est tout à fait légal, puisqu'ils possèdent des papiers en règle et même des visas».

Risque plus large

Mais tous ne sont pas d'accord avec cette analyse. «Il n'y a pas d'avertissement de cet ordre», a contredit une source italienne anonyme au quotidien *Corriere della Se-*

ra. Néanmoins, des «combattants étrangers» en Syrie souhaitent se rendre en Europe, notamment en Belgique, pour «commettre un attentat», a affirmé ce mardi le chef de l'organe chargé d'évaluer la menace terroriste en Belgique, quatre semaines après les attaques jihadistes qui ont fait 32 morts et 340 blessés à Bruxelles.

«Il y a beaucoup de renseignements, par exemple des signaux que des FTT (Foreign terrorist fighters), des combattants en Syrie, voudraient retourner, pas seulement vers la Belgique, mais vers l'Europe, pour commettre un attentat», a déclaré Paul Van Tigchelt, directeur de l'Ocam (Organe de coordination pour l'analyse de la menace).

(L'essentiel/mch/mst/AFP

<http://www.lessentiel.Daech-voudrait-attaquer-des-plages-en-Europe-11328967>

Does Heightened Security Really Matter After Terrorists Strike?

APRIL 21, 2016 | 08:04 GMT

Belgian police block a road during a March 18 police raid in Brussels. A recent statistical analysis suggesting terrorist attacks in the West do not "cluster" is at risk of being misunderstood by policymakers. (DIRK WAEM/AFP/Getty Images)

By [Scott Stewart](#)

Brian Michael Jenkins and his team at the RAND Corp. recently released the results of a statistical analysis of terrorist attacks. Designed to determine whether terrorist attacks occur in clusters, the study examined terrorist activity in the United States and Western Europe from 1970 to 2013.

In conducting their analysis, Jenkins and his team divided data on attacks from the Global Terrorism Database into three eras: 1970-1993, 1994-2002, and 2003-2013. The statistics showed that in the first two time periods, additional attacks were more likely to follow in the wake of a "triggering event" such as a significant attack. During these eras, the study found that domestic terrorist organizations in the United Kingdom (Provisional Irish Republican Army) and Spain (Basque ETA) accounted for 75 percent of the clustering. In the most recent era, however, there was no evidence of clustering.

The study's conclusion has serious implications for authorities and citizens. Although clustering was not detected in the 2003-2013 period, the researchers noted that the incidence of terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe has dramatically fallen since 9/11 because of increased security. And even though Jenkins and his team noted that their findings do not imply that locally increased security is unwarranted after an attack, this is the conclusion many have drawn. It's dangerous to base security policy merely on historical statistics — especially if one attempts to apply it universally.

The Limits of the Study

Universal conclusions should not be drawn from the study because it accounts only for terrorist attacks in the United States and Western Europe. Despite an increase in the number of terrorist attacks worldwide, attacks in the United States and Western Europe have declined.

The nature of jihadist terrorism often requires transnational groups to send operatives from abroad to attack hostile territory. Conducting terrorist attacks from a distance is cumbersome for operations security purposes, and the [attack cycle](#) for long-range attacks can be quite protracted. For example, both the 9/11 and 2008 Mumbai hotel attacks took years to plan and execute. Coordinating consecutive long-range, long-distance attacks can be all the more difficult because a cell's logistical channels are often discovered and cut off after the first incident. Al Qaeda's failure to conduct its oft-threatened follow-up attack to 9/11 is good evidence of this complication. Jihadist groups have therefore shifted their operational model to include leaderless resistance initiatives for equipping grassroots operatives. Groups such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula adopted a strategy to attack the United States by targeting

American aircraft with bombs sent from abroad.

To conduct attacks from a distance requires a model different from that used by domestic or regional terrorist groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army or jihadists in Libya or Pakistan. Operating in or near areas where they have significant support, such groups are often able to employ a much quicker attack cycle or even manage several attacks in different stages of the attack cycle concurrently. For example, because Kurdish militants and the Marxist Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front both work from their home turf in Turkey, near the jihadist theater in Syria and Iraq, it is little wonder [we are seeing clusters of attacks there](#).

Accordingly, people must not interpret the RAND study to mean that terrorist attacks never cluster anywhere or that elevating security after an attack is unnecessary in every location. When authorities see an attack that could trigger a broader campaign, such as the terrorist offensive in Turkey or the "[knife intifada](#)" in Israel, increasing security is prudent. But this does not apply only in places outside of Europe and the United States.

Application in the U.S. and Europe

It is important to recognize that the RAND study is based only on statistics, and those statistics count attacks only. Since I have not seen RAND's raw data, I am unsure, for example, whether they included the failed copycat plot in London on July 21, 2005, as a clustered attack. Coming two weeks after the deadly July 7 bombings in London, the July 21 attacks defy the study's statistical trend.

Moreover, RAND's focus on clustered attacks in a single city may be misleading in today's threat environment. The jihadist terrorist threat is transnational, and so are its campaigns. Recent attacks by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Bamako, Mali; Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; and Grand-Bassam, Ivory Coast, represent a cluster of related attacks, but they were spread across several nations. Though AQIM's attacks occurred outside the areas examined in the study, we have seen similar transnational clusters inside Europe. Though they happened in different countries, the Paris and Brussels attacks were clearly related, having been planned and executed by the same transnational cell.

Furthermore, law enforcement operations in the wake of the attacks disrupted other plots that were near the end of the attack planning cycle. If security had not been increased and if aggressive investigations had not resulted in more leads and raids, more attacks would have followed in both cities. In fact, reports indicate that investigative leads from the Brussels and Paris attacks helped thwart attacks in other parts of Europe.

Some may argue that the large, complex network behind the Paris and Brussels attacks is a product of Europe's [location and historical links to the Muslim world](#), and I would agree. But the jihadist threat is more widespread, and the emergence of the leaderless resistance phenomenon has turned the traditional understanding of the terrorist attack planning cycle and operational tempo on its head.

Unlike a hierarchical group that has to plan operations with the resources at its disposal — a factor that can affect the tempo of its operational cycle — leaderless resistance enables several individuals or [small cells](#) to concurrently and independently plan operations using the resources available to each actor. Such attacks tend to be

smaller than those conducted by professional terrorists. But as the unprecedented rash of jihadist [leaderless resistance attacks](#) in late 2014 and early 2015 illustrated, even small attacks can generate a great deal of publicity. And again, even though those attacks occurred across a range of locations, from Canada to Australia, they were clustered.

And [leaderless resistance](#) is intentionally amorphous. Anyone can become radicalized and decide to act as a lone assailant or cooperate with friends and relatives to form a small operational cell. This means actors who present a threat can be widely spread, or even live in the same area unbeknownst to each other. This seems to have been the case with the 7/7 and 7/21 London cells. The second cell appears to have been unconnected to the first one. Inspired by first attack, the second cell dispatched the same number of suicide bombers armed with bombs of similar size, but, fortunately, it lacked a competent bombmaker. If the devices had detonated as designed, the 7/21 attack could have been every bit as deadly as its inspiration.

Certainly, I have long been critical of authorities who, in the wake of an attack, engage in "[security theater](#)." Highly visible, knee-jerk measures targeting the methods and tactics used in a previous attack have little ability to prevent attacks using different techniques. This included the practice of making passengers remove their shoes for security screenings before allowing them to board a commercial airliner.

At the same time, not every security increase has to be smoke and mirrors. Balanced, sensible and cost-effective security measures can and should be instituted. Such measures will not only go further to assure the public that government security services are competent, but they can also help ensure that attacks are isolated rather than clustered. Notwithstanding RAND's statistics, there is an argument for heightening prudent and logical security measures following a terrorist attack — and not only in the targeted locale.

<https://www.stratfor.com/>

Iraq

Leaked Islamic State records deliver insight into fighters

Isis files obtained by media reveal an evolving organisation learning from past mistakes

Apr 23, 2016



Iraqi government forces under Islamic State slogans, in the town of Heet, which they are battling to retake from Isis jihadists. Photograph: Moadh Al-Dulaimi/AFP/Getty Images

It's a diverse, fast-growing organisation with an expanding bureaucracy. Integrating its well-educated, multilingual workforce is a major headache, but its leaders are preoccupied with ensuring it harnesses the skills and talents of its many inexperienced recruits.

These are the growing pains not of a successful tech start-up but of Islamic State, the apocalyptic jihadist group that has laid claim to vast swathes of territory across [Syria](#) and [Iraq](#) while spawning affiliates in north Africa and south Asia.

The insights are contained in a cache of Islamic State personnel records obtained by international media last month.

The documents, which were produced primarily between early 2013 and late 2014, provide new insights into the background and motivation of thousands of foreign fighters who joined the group, which is also known as Isis, in that period.

A study of the haul by the Combating Terrorism Center, a research and policy institution at the [United States Military Academy](#) in West Point, New York, found that the 11,000 files leaked by an Isis defector in March contained 4,600 individual records.

The centre said it was able to cross-reference the documents against a pre-existing repository of Islamic State records held by the US Department of Defence, allowing it to corroborate 98 per cent of the leaked files.

Fighter from Ireland

The records largely comprise standardised forms filled out by new arrivals in Islamic State-controlled territory in Syria, although some appear to have been filled in by officials on their behalf.

The forms list responses to questions on citizenship, previous occupations, education levels, religious knowledge, previous jihadist experience and other topics.

The fighters came from over 70 countries, with [Saudi Arabia](#), [Tunisia](#), [Morocco](#), [Turkey](#) and Egypt making up the top five countries of origin.

[http://www.irishtimes.com/news/-](http://www.irishtimes.com/news/)

Islamic State fighters from 70 countries, analysis shows

April 20, 2016



PHOTO: REUTERS

PARIS: Analysis of a windfall of data from inside Islamic State shows fighters of more than 70 nationalities joined the ruthless jihadist group, researchers said after examining thousands of records.

The treasure trove came from an IS defector who handed over some 11,000 personnel files to US television network NBC, although more than half were found to be duplicates.

NBC then passed 4,600 of the documents to the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC), which is based at West Point but independent from the US military academy.

The documents are one of several large-scale leaks from within IS this year.

Thousands of apparent IS registration documents were leaked in January to a Syrian opposition news website and in March the German daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and German broadcasters said they had obtained similar records. German security services also had access to that material.

The CTC said that by comparing the documents it received from NBC against similar IS personnel records maintained by the US Defense Department, it was able to corroborate “approximately 98 percent” of them.

The forms, completed by recruits in Arabic and often including notes from the assessors, refer to around 30 percent of the estimated 15,000 new recruits who entered Syria during 2013 and 2014.

The analysis provided not only a composite picture of the fighters but also an insight into how IS is “attempting to vet new members, manage talent effectively... and deal with a diverse pool of recruits,” said the report, which is available on the CTC website.

The recruits ranged in age from 12 to nearly 70, although the average age was 26 or 27.

Only 400 were under 18 upon entering the self-declared IS “caliphate”.

The leading nationality with 579 new fighters, was Saudi, followed by Tunisian (559), Moroccan (240), Turkish (212), Egyptian (151) and Russian (141).

There were 49 from France, 38 from Germany, 30 from Lebanon, 26 from Britain, 11 from Australia and seven from Canada, but none from the United States.

Thirty percent said they were married, while 61 percent were single, with another eight percent unknown.

Some 1,371 said they had finished high school while 1,028 said they had attended university.

“The group seems overall to be generally well-educated, especially when compared to United Nations data on the average years of schooling in the countries in the dataset,” the report said.

The forms showed that IS intake officers interviewed the new recruits to assess their suitability for a range of roles in its apparatus.

“While the Islamic State needs some suicide bombers, it also needs personnel to fill roles like conventional soldiers, sharia officials, police and security or administrative positions,” the CTC report said.

Thus one personnel officer wrote of a new recruit: “Important: he has experience in chemistry.”

But when a 24-year-old Turkish entrant said his professional experience was as a drug dealer, the remark was: “May God forgive him and us!”

Nearly 10 percent reported having waged jihad previously, including a Frenchman who said he fought in Mali, while only 12 percent said they were prepared to carry out suicide attacks.

The cache also included 431 “exit forms” for departing jihadists, with reasons for leaving including the need for medical treatment, usually in neighbouring Turkey, or for family reasons.

Other remarks included simply “lied” for two of the fighters; “If he comes back

again, he'll be imprisoned"; "could not practise patience"; "does not want the military life and jihad"; and "confusion with matters".

More sinister were exit forms noting: "Go back to Libya and organise the way for the State"; "A task" and "Omar al-Shishani charged him with a job in Turkey".

Shishani, or "Omar the Chechen", who was effectively IS's defence minister, was killed last month.

One line on the entry form is left blank, initially at least: Date and place of death.

<http://tribune.com.pk/story/1088467/islamic-state-fighters-from-70-countries-analysis-shows/>

Analysis: The Islamic State may be losing ground, but not influence



First, the good news: the Islamic State is under pressure, and losing territory. The bad news, however, is this is an organisation that thrives on change and adversity, and it is already expanding its sphere of influence in other ways. By JASMINE OPPERMAN and CLEMMIE DOUCHEZ-LORTET.

The Islamic State is under pressure and faces numerous challenges, which include a decline in foreign fighters travelling to Iraq and Syria, territorial losses, precarious revenue streams and the loss of high-level leaders through aerial bombings. These vulnerabilities are real, and significant, but it would be far too early to write off the Islamic State (IS) just yet. Given the group's expanding presence in both Europe and Africa, it seems that reports of the Islamic State's imminent demise are greatly exaggerated.

Even while it has been waging a war on the home front in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State has succeeded in creating pipelines of support in both Africa and Europe. It has achieved this through:

- A constant propaganda voice, largely social media-driven, that can attract recruits and influence and direct behaviour;
- Physically recruiting new members through individual recruiters and carefully orchestrated recruitment cells;
- Creating a cell network of operatives that can initiate terrorist attacks, either at their own initiative or in response to a command.

At the core of the [IS pipelines](#) is an intricate system of recruitment and networking.

This does not happen in a standardised manner: networking involves a complex mix of places, ranging from mosques and prisons to entire neighbourhoods in the suburbs of capital cities such as Paris and Nairobi; of connections, be it family (siblings often – though not always – help radicalise each other), friends and mentors; and, in certain cases, of connections with previously established jihadist networks.



Photo: Isis fighters training in Somalia.

These pipelines are expanding continuously, which means that any talk of a shrinking IS Caliphate must come with a caveat: that although it may physically control less territory in places like Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and Libya, the group's sphere of influence is actually growing. This gives the group a whole new, yet equally dangerous, dimension.

The recent attacks in Brussels and Paris give us an idea of how it all works. In the wake of the attacks, a number of European terrorists were identified, arrested, and convicted by the authorities. What was initially described as a “group”, a “cell”, or even a “network” in fact appeared to be a much larger enterprise than anyone could have expected.

[Abdelhamid Abaaoud](#), the orchestrator of the November 2015 Paris attacks, was also the mentor of Amedy Coulibaly – one of the attackers of the January 2015 Paris attacks. Abaaoud was the mentor of a number of other jihadists and the orchestrator of several other thwarted terrorist attacks. He had links to the Verviers cell in Belgium, the April 2015 thwarted attack in Villejuif, the gunman who opened fire on a train going from Amsterdam to Paris, and a suspect who admitted wanting to carry out an attack in a concert venue in France who was arrested in August 2015.

The [Paris and Brussels](#) attacks further evidenced the connections between the two groups of attackers: Mohamed Abrini, the third suicide bomber of the Zaventem airport whose bomb failed to detonate, was also seen driving one of the cars used in the Paris attacks mere days before the events. [Salah Abdeslam](#), the most wanted man in Europe in the aftermath of the Paris attacks, was arrested just days before the Brus-

sels attacks, and had strong ties to all the Brussels attackers. Najim Laachraoui, one of the two suicide bombers of the Zaventem airport, was also the bomb-maker of both attacks in Paris and Brussels.




Photo: Chapter cover page of Dabiq 13 - released 22 January 2016 - contains a large section on the Paris Cell.



Photo: Former Shabaab commander Abdiqadir Mumin, (aka Ikrima al-Muhajir) was a senior commander in al-Shabaab before switching allegiance to IS in Somalia.

With a total of three major successful terrorist attacks, and at least six thwarted terrorist plots in Europe, investigations by the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC) confirm that although all the different cells, groups and networks responsible for organising the various attacks might seem like disconnected and independent entities, they were in fact part of a much wider enterprise. All these individuals and groups in fact had several ties to one another, and further than that, had ties to several other networks across the continent.

Africa is reflecting a similar pattern, with pipelines of support from [Senegal](#), north-east Nigeria, Tunisia, [Algeria](#) and [Sudan](#) to Libya. These extend, albeit not so powerfully, all the way down the continent to South Africa. The existence of these African pipelines mean that even if the Islamic State were to be defeated in Libya, it would not spell the end of their presence on the African continent.

Compared to Europe, these pipelines have not shown a similar inter-connectedness, but that does not necessarily make them less effective, as seen in for example in the attacks on hotels at Sousse, Tunisia in June 2015.

On 25 April 2016 an unknown group claimed the first IS attack in Somalia via the group's official media house Amaq. The claim does indicate the existence of [pro-IS elements in Somalia](#), though the extent of an organised presence has not been determined. Albeit unverified, reports that IS are willing to pay former al-Shabaab fighters \$400 per month to convince them to switch allegiance shows the determination of IS to secure a more consolidated pipeline in Somalia.

On 8 April 2016, a new jihadist group, [Jahba East Africa](#), announced itself, accompanied by a pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State. Though not verified, the group is probably comprised of former supporters of al-Shabaab. The statement referred to an already established presence in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

As in Europe, North Africa with specific reference to [Tunisia](#) has shown that pipelines carry a two-way traffic situation whereby IS fighters can be moved back to countries of origin, leading to terror attacks. On 7 March 2016, approximately 50 Islamist fighters attacked the city of Ben Guerdane, in Tunisia. The Ben Guerdane attacks were conducted by the IS-affiliated Sabratha cell in Libya, which means IS militants used Libya as a support zone for operations across the border in Tunisia.

As pressure mounts on IS in Syria and Iraq as well as Libya, so one can expect an increase in the use of these pipelines. Inevitably, with that comes an increased vulnerability to attacks.

Ultimately, IS as a government is facing serious challenges, but as a terror group is creating alternative lifelines for itself. When creating counterterrorism strategies to counter the group, it is vital to take these other dimensions of the group into account. **DM**

Jasmine Opperman and Clemmie Douchez-Lortet are (respectively) the Africa and Europe Directors for the Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium.

Main photo: A military truck is stationed at the 'Grand Place' in front of the City Hall in Brussels, Belgium, 21 November 2015. Last night Belgium raised the alert

status at Level 4/4 as 'serious and imminent' threat of an attack, the main effect are closing of all Metro Line in Brussels, all soccer match of league one and two cancelled countrywide. Belgium government said 'the advice for the population is to avoid places where a lot of people come together like shopping centres, concerts, events or public transport stations wherever possible. EPA/STEPHANIE LECOCQ.

<http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/>

Italy

News Analysis: Italian experts warn not to mix up migrant crisis with terror threat

2016-04-21

Source: Xinhua ROME, April 21 (Xinhua) -- The increasing terror threat has led many Italians to be more suspicious about the incessant arrivals of migrants from African and Middle Eastern countries, but local experts say there is no real connection between the two issues.

Earlier this week, Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano rubbished a report by German daily Bild speaking of Italian concerns over terrorists disguised as beach hawkers possibly blowing themselves up on Italian beaches.

Italy is facing growing flows of migrants across the Mediterranean sea.

Some 9,600 landed in March, mostly from Nigeria, Somalia and Gambia, more than double the number that came in February, according to the [European Union](#) (EU) border agency Frontex. Hundreds, including many children, have been reported dead or missing since the beginning of this year.

Local experts warn, however, that the terrorism and migrant issues must not be mixed up.

"A recent report of the Italian intelligence has said that terrorists are not reaching Europe via sea. In fact, none of those who took part in the Paris or Brussels attacks had crossed the Mediterranean," Sabrina Magris, a security expert and president of the Florence-based Ecole Universitaire Internationale (EUI), told Xinhua.

"We cannot exclude that there might be some infiltrations of terror sympathizers amid so many thousands of people, but the risk to die at sea would be too high indeed for terrorists who have been instructed and trained for an attack," she highlighted.

Magris said terrorists are more likely to take planes, travel in business class and sleep in luxury hotels.

One of the Brussels suicide bombers, Khalid El Bakraoui, was found for example to have transited in Italy by air and have spent the night in a four-star hotel in Venice, she noted.

In her view, intelligence services should pay special attention to the flows by air and also by buses, "given the large number of buses that are crossing Europe and can become an easy way to move from one country to another, avoiding strict controls."

But "true cooperation in the fight against terrorism" is what the EU especially needs, "as terrorists have proved capable of acting much faster than our institutions," Magris stressed.

Daniele Brigadoi Cologna, founder of the social research agency Codici and researcher on sociology of immigration at the University of Insubria, agreed on the "need to understand that the terrorism issue has very little to do with the migrant crisis."

The only link between them could be that the mismanagement of asylum seekers who flee wars and crises creates migration channels into Europe that might be infiltrated by potential terrorists, he said.

"We should remember that the terror attacks in Europe were carried out by people who were born and raised in European countries. It means that we are talking about Britain, French or Belgian citizens," Brigadoi Cologna said.

"We are mixing everything up, and the reason is that in Italy but also in other European countries the migration issue is used for electoral purposes rather than being looked at as a phenomenon that transforms societies and requests long-term investments in integration policies," he underlined.

But the lack of these long-term policies, he insisted, is exactly behind the social malaise which has aroused in European countries.

High differences in terms of language, ethnic groups, religion and culture should be the themes at the center of European debate, and not the protection of borders, Brigadoi Cologna highlighted, also referring to Austria's toughening of border controls as a response to the migrant crisis.

He recalled that Europe in the past decades has absorbed without big problems millions of refugees during the Yugoslavian and other conflicts. And the around one million migrants who reached Europe via sea last year, he added, are just 20 percent of all the migrants who arrived through regular routes from any part of the world.

"I am a convinced Europeanist. But the political deficit that Europe is showing now in this respect is discouraging, and risks to put in danger and break apart the EU," Brigadoi Cologna said.

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/>

Decriminalizing cannabis would hurt Islamic State, mafia-Italy prosecutor

18 April 2016

Decriminalizing cannabis sales would strike a blow against Islamic State militants and Italian mobsters who, according to ongoing investigations, are smuggling hashish together, Italy's top prosecutor told Reuters.

The main smuggling route for North African hash - compressed cannabis resin - now runs from Casablanca, Morocco, through Algeria, Tunisia to Tobruk in eastern Libya, said national anti-mafia and anti-terrorism chief Franco Roberti.

Along that route is the seaside city of Sirte, which now serves as a Mediterranean base for the most powerful Islamic State (IS) branch outside Syria and Iraq.

"Certainly IS controls the Libya route; it controls the coast along the Gulf of Sirte," said Roberti in his frescoed office in the 17th century building that once served as the Vatican prison.

In investigations whose details have not yet been made public, police have found evidence that Italian organized crime, which has long controlled most of the country's illegal drug supplies, and "suspected terrorists" in North Africa are trafficking hash together, Roberti said.

"Decriminalization or even legalization would definitely be a weapon against traffickers, among whom there could be terrorists who make money off of it," he told Reuters.

Citing estimates by the United Nations Office on Narcotics and Crime, Roberti said that the illegal drugs trade, which includes cannabis and hash, earns more than 32 billion euros (\$36.10 billion) annually for Italian organized crime.

Islamic State controls just a part of the North African route, but the narcotics trade as a whole provides just under seven percent of the group's funding, according to a report by analysis company IHS published on Monday.

In his new book "Il contrario della paura" or "The opposite of fear", the 68-year-old Roberti writes at length about the similarities between Islamic militant groups and Italy's mafias, and he reflects on ways to improve the fight against both.

Italy has not been attacked by Islamist militants, but IS propaganda films regularly mention Rome and the Vatican as possible targets. Many Italian sites are considered at high risk of attacks, Roberti said.

Prime Minister Matteo Renzi's government gave Roberti's office, which has coordinated the national fight against organized crime since the early 1990s, the job of overseeing investigations into terrorism in February last year.

Since then, Roberti and his team of experienced mob prosecutors have begun to add terror cases to a national database previously dedicated only to organized crime, he said.

COSA NOSTRA

One reason it makes sense for his office to coordinate anti-terror investigations is that Islamist militants and traditional mafias - like Sicily's Cosa Nostra - commit similar crimes, Roberti said.

"International terrorism finances itself with criminal activities that are typical of the mafia, like drug trafficking, smuggling commercial goods, smuggling oil, smuggling archaeological relics and art, kidnapping for ransom, and extortion," he said.

Facing the huge challenges of fighting people smuggling, cocaine trafficking, and international terrorism, investigators are spending too much time and energy to combat cannabis dealers, and to little effect, said Roberti.

"We spend a lot of resources uselessly. We have not succeeded in reducing cannabinoid trafficking. On the contrary, it's increasing," said Roberti, who has been combating the mafia for more than three decades.

"Is it worth using investigative energy to fight street sales of soft drugs?" he asks. According to the most recent government data, about 3.5 million Italians between the ages of 15-64 used cannabis in 2014.

Cannabis is much less damaging than hard or synthetic drugs, which should not be decriminalized, he said. But Italy's laws against selling or growing cannabis are severe and can lead to imprisonment.

A bipartisan group of lawmakers proposed legalizing cannabis possession and cultivation earlier this year, but it is not supported by the leaders of any major parties.

In his book Roberti suggests that all of Europe, and not just Italy, should be considering a better use of investigative resources: "On decriminalization (of cannabis), there should be an Italian domestic debate, but also a European one."

(\$1 = 0.8865 euros)

<http://www.reuters.com/>

Turkey

Can Turkey boost the Muslim world's counterterrorism efforts?

19 April 2016



Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan (L) welcomes his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rowhani during the Organisation of Islamic

Turkey, as new chair of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), wants a focus on counter-terrorism.

As such, an Istanbul-based multinational police coordination center for Muslim states will be established within the OIC.

The final communiqué of the organization's summit in Istanbul stressed "the need to adopt a comprehensive Islamic strategy to combat terrorism and extremism, and for the OIC to play an effective role in international efforts to combat terrorism, in the framework of constructive cooperation with States and international and regional organizations and initiatives."

Feasibility

Some analysts see this goal as overly ambitious, but an important - if symbolic - step in the right direction.

"The OIC is a weak intergovernmental institution with limited resources and capacity. Its symbolism is much more important than its deeds," Galip Dalay, research director at Al-Sharq Forum, told Al Arabiya English.

"The political, ideological, democratic and economic gaps between its members are too wide to enable it to develop a coherent strategy to fight terrorism in earnest."



Leaders and representatives of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) member states pose for a group photo during the Istanbul Summit in Istanbul, Turkey April 14, 2016. (Reuters)

However, Eyup Ersoy, an expert on Gulf politics at Bilkent University in Ankara, says Turkey can raise awareness in Muslim societies about the destructive consequences of radicalization, and the illegitimacy of terrorist groups.

He adds that a single institution working on that issue is unnecessary and insufficient, and does not solve existing differences of opinion among Muslim countries. “For example, for some Muslim states the Muslim Brotherhood is a grave internal threat officially recognized as a terrorist group. For others, it’s an ally as a civic Islamic social movement,” Ersoy said.

“Moreover, being a party to an institution is no guarantee of achieving cooperation with other parties in that institution.”

Instead of proliferating institutions under the OIC, Turkey should consolidate its ties with relevant Muslim countries on issues of common concern, he added.

Sectarianism

In his recent speeches, including during the opening ceremony of the OIC summit, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said the greatest challenge facing Muslims was sectarianism. “My religion is not that of Sunnis or of Shiites. My religion is Islam,” he said.

Ersoy said gathering states of different sects around common projects under Turkish chairmanship of the OIC would demonstrate cooperation, but would be difficult given the divergent threat perceptions and security considerations of OIC member states.

“Turkey could intensify its efforts to respond to the legitimacy claims of terrorist groups based on sectarian identities,” he said.



Turkish soldiers stand guard near the site of an explosion in Ankara. (File photo: Reuters)

“This is less difficult, but riskier as it would make Turkey the primary target of terrorist groups with different sectarian identities.”

The OIC is the second-largest intergovernmental organization after the United Nations, with 57 member states spread over four continents. Turkey has been a member since the OIC’s establishment in 1969.

<http://english.alarabiya.net/>

Back to Square One in Libya

Even after the chaos and bloodshed in Libya, the U.S. may not change its strategy.

April 29, 2016, at 2:15 p.m.

President Barack Obama recently [admitted](#) that his biggest mistake in office was "probably failing to plan for the day after what I think was the right thing to do in intervening in Libya." Tell us something we don't know.

At least he moved significantly further than former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who valiantly claims that the [Libyan intervention](#) represented U.S. "smart power at its best," that the country administered two successful [elections](#) in which they voted moderates into office and that "we [didn't lose](#) a single person" in the conflict. The families of Ambassador Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty – the four Americans murdered in Benghazi on Sept. 11, 2012 – would likely disagree with her assessment.

Libya persists in an ongoing disaster that could have, and should have, been avoided.

Moammar Gadhafi crystallized the threats to his regime – which were the same radical jihadists who endangered the U.S. – when I met with him on three separate occasions between 2004 and 2009. Recently released transcripts of [telephone conversations](#) between former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Gadhafi in 2011 reveal that the dictator presented similar arguments on the threat to Europe.

The [Joint Chiefs of Staff](#) reportedly highlighted evidence to the president that revealed no indications of an impending genocide if Gadhafi endured. They warned that removing him would serve no compelling American interest and that it would open the doors to forces aligned with al-Qaida.

It appears that the president not only did not plan for the "day after" the military campaign – when the threats of a post-Gadhafi Libya had already been articulated – he discounted critical advice and insights leading to the strongman's deposition and the likely resulting catastrophe.

The most serious mistake is that five years after initially "failing to plan," [no strategy exists](#) today on how to contain the threat posed by the Islamic State group and like-minded groups in North Africa. For perhaps the first time, terrorists – not only [state sponsors](#) such as Iran and Syria – control real estate and infrastructure.

As documented in a recent [Investigative Project on Terrorism analysis](#), the Islamic State group has created a caliphate in Sirte along the Mediterranean in Libya that exports weapons, fighters, ideology, death and destruction throughout Africa, into Europe and eventually to North America.

An Islamic State group coterie of lethal and battle-hardened veterans of Iraq and Af-

ghanistan operates from the Islamist bazaar in the Derna area of eastern Libya. Known as Katibat al-Battar, it recruited Belgian-Moroccan [Abdelhamid Abaaoud](#), whom authorities suspect as the orchestrator of the November terrorist massacre in Paris.

In other parts of Africa, Islamist organizations such as Boko Haram, al-Shabab, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar al-Sharia fight for their own territory and dominance.

Furthermore, multiple reports indicate that the Islamic State group and other jihadists are seeking to obtain the stockpiles of chemical munitions captured after Gadhafi's downfall. Such groups have demonstrated a willingness to use them.

Additional reports suggest that the administration and U.S. military brass remains at odds over the next steps while the violence proceeds nearly unmolested.

The Director of National Intelligence states the obvious when he says that Islamist factions in Libya will continue to pose a challenge and a threat while Obama refuses to deploy the resources necessary to decimate them.

Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi [warns](#) the West against intervening militarily again, lest Libya slide further into anarchy. He counsels it to strengthen the army of Libya's fledgling but internationally recognized attempt at a unity government and enable it to stabilize the country.

El-Sissi unfortunately might offer the most rational recommendation. In plain English, one could interpret his admonishment as advocating for the West to arm a new strongman to run the country so that he can corral the nihilistic Islamist terrorists.

That such a strategy would return the conflict to where it began five years ago – except that it now might feature a slightly kinder and gentler version of Gadhafi – is a sad manifestation of how much things stayed the same after all the bloodshed and chaos.

<http://www.usnews.com/>

Countering Violent Extremism: The War on Terror, Reset

04/18/2016

On April 6-7, there was a major [symposium](#) on CVE, Countering Violent Extremism, that brought, experts, government officials, national leadership and practitioners together to deliberate on the state of America's efforts to respond to the challenge of rising extremism. The symposium was hosted by [Creative Associates](#), a global player in implementing the essential and softer side of CVE and in global development, in partnership with the [International Peace and Security Institute](#). Some of the key speakers at the convention included Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Jeh Johnson, Senator Cory Booker and the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah Al-Saud. The convention was scheduled a year after the White House' Global [summit on CVE](#) and was geared towards assessing progress and recalibrating strategy.

What is CVE | Countering Violent Extremism

Countering Violent Extremism is essentially President Obama's initiative seeking to reset the so-called 'war on terror' and to continue the fight against terrorism and extremism but hopefully sans the negativity that went with the Bush-Cheney response to the attacks on America on September 11, 2001. The Bush administration's response was full of hubris, uninformed, ideological, and mostly unilateral. It disregarded ethics and civil rights, used torture, illegal detentions, and was perceived by many as an unfair attack on all Muslims. Critics and extremists labeled it as "war on Islam" and it created more extremists than it eliminated.

There are three philosophical differences, in my view, between the CVE approach and the War on Terror approach. First, the CVE approach is without hubris and recognizes that the United States' cannot do it alone. The US needs the entire world to help it fight the global scourge of violent extremism and more importantly it needs the help and support of Muslims, both at home and abroad, to be successful. Secondly, [it admits that the "root causes" that feed into extremism](#) must be addressed. The previous approach denied even the idea of root causes and tried to blame Islam as the reason for violence. And finally the CVE approach recognizes that non-violent strategies to counter extremism, such as using development, job creation, improving governance, fighting corruption, advancing counter narratives, are all as important if not more critical than just use of force and law enforcement methods. I discuss other differences in the video above. Please review it for more analysis.

As I listened to the speakers, I realized that those who worked in aid and development, both in the public and private sector, had a very sound grasp of the realities of the Muslim World and understood how important it was to address the root causes that trigger and nurture extremist ideologies and facilitate their proliferation. Some of the programs initiated by USAID in critical countries like Afghanistan and Nigeria are bearing fruit and if executed on a larger scale, can potentially stem the spread of extremism. War, may kill some extremists but it will radicalize many more. America's experience with Iraq has already taught us that; a war that was supposed to liberate us from a dictator has created the conditions for ISIS to emerge. And it cost trillions of dollars. But aid projects cost less, cause no deaths, radicalize no one and help stem the spread of radicalism.



Secretary Jeh Johnson

Secretary Jeh Johnson made some very thoughtful observations. He argued that CVE was a critical component of national security; it was not targeting at any religion, it enjoys bipartisan support, and relies on community partnership. About American Muslims, he claimed correctly that the community is very diverse, and that many of its members are very patriotic Americans. But his most important point, and this was also echoed by Senator Booker, was that attempts to isolate and vilify American Muslims would be counter to our national interests and national security.

I was part of the panel on the role of religious voices in challenging extremism. I argued that religion was not the cause of extremism but could serve either as an enabler or disabler. We have to harness the potential for compassion, tolerance and peaceful coexistence within Islam and actually teach it to Muslims - not just use for propaganda while talking about Islam to media - in our mosques, Islamic schools and gatherings. I identified the factors that pulled Western Muslim towards extremism and those that pushed them towards it. Both must be addressed. We need a complex, multipronged strategy to combat violent extremism and using religious narratives is just one tool in the toolbox.

The symposium clearly was addressing one of the key issues that impact our national security and global peace. I found it fascinating and stimulating.

<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/>

Disclaimer of Liability and Endorsement

While the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) strives to make the information on this publication as timely and accurate as possible, the ACSRT makes no claims, promises, or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of its contents, and expressly disclaims liability for errors and omissions in its contents. No warranty of any kind, implied, expressed, or statutory, including but not limited to the warranties of non-infringement of third party rights, title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose or freedom from computer virus, is given with respect to the contents of this publication or its links to other Internet resources.

It should be noted that any opinions expressed are the responsibility of the authors and not of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), its publication board, its management or any funder or sponsor of the ACSRT, nor that of the African Union Commission (AUC),

Reference in this publication to any specific commercial product, process, or service, or the use of any trade, firm or corporation name is for the information and convenience of the public, and does not constitute endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the ACSRT and AUC.